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IN LUCE TUA
Comment on Contemporary A Hairs by the Editor
The Intervention in Grenada
The intervention in Grenada has turned out so well
that perhaps the strongest point to be made against it is
that it could occasion excessive pride and self-confidence among those who brought it off. We can imagine
-though we hope otherwise- that in the aftermath of
Grenada some people in the national security apparatus
might be tempted to the suggestion, "Why not Nicaragua?" That cautionary surmise aside, however, we
can think of no persuasive reason for withholding support from the government's Grenadian policy.
This is not, of course, a judgment that all reasonable
people acquiesce in. Critics of the intervention argue
variously that it was not necessary , that it violated basic
principles of international behavior, that its costs outweighed its benefits, and that it represented a dangerous
and unthinking militarization of American foreign
policy. Those are not frivolous objections, but the. more
closely one examines them the less telling they appear.
Opponents of the intervention argue, in the first
instance, that the Reagan Administration's expressed
concern for the safety of the American students on the
island should be treated skeptically. There is no evidence, they insist, that the students were ever in danger;
indeed, they point out, Grenadian officials had attempted to offer assurances that the students would not be
harmed. In any case, the argument concludes, even if
the U.S. thought it necessary to evacuate the students,
that action would not have required the full invasion
and occupation of the island.
Defenders of the Administration would certainly
have a difficult time establishing that protection of
American lives was the only purpose of the intervention.
The government clearly had additional ends in mind.
But that is not to say that the Administration's expressions of concern over the students' safety were hypocritical or that the students were not in fact in danger.
There is no way of knowing what would have happened
to the students had America not intervened. Perhaps
nothing. But a great many of them thought they were
in danger, as did most of the members of the bipartisan
Congressional committee who later went to Grenada
to investigate the matter. Neither the students nor the
Democratic members of the Congressional committee
had any reason to conjure up dangers that did not exist.
Given the state of chaos and violence that prevailed in
Grenada and given as well the vivid memories of the
Iranian hostage fiasco , it is difficult to see the Administration's concern for the students' safety as anything
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other than prudent and responsible.
The question of the students' safety aside, opposition
to the Grenadian venture has focused primarily on the
presumed American violation of the principle of nonintervention in the internal affairs of sovereign nations.
America had no right, the argument goes, to presume
to determine how or by whom Grenada should be
governed. If Americans object to Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan, critics ask, by what logic do they justify
their own intervention in Grenada?
This is one of those cases where abstract moral principle can become the enemy of moral clarity. In the first
place, virtually no one holds to an absolute doctrine of
non-intervention. Was it wrong to intervene in Idi
Amin's Uganda? Would those who become morally
exercised over American actions in Grenada object to
attempts by outside powers to undermine the government of South Africa? We know the answers to those
questions, even as we know, or ought to know, how
absurd it is to compare Grenada with Afghanistan.
In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union is brutally imposing
its will on a nation whose people manifestly oppose
Russian control. If the Russians manage to overcome
the Afghani resistance, as in time they presumably will,
the government they install and maintain will be, by all
precedent, an oppressive dictatorship. Nowhere has
the imposition of Soviet influence meant anything else.
Compare Grenada. Before the American intervention, the Marxist government led by Maurice Bishop,
which had itself come to power through a coup, had
been overthrown by a group led by Bernard Coard that
apparently found Bishop's regime insufficiently radical. Bishop and many other members of his government were murdered. Coard's group presided over a
situation of violent uncertainty. A number of Grenada's
neighboring islands, banded together as the Organization of East Caribbean States, invited the United States
to intervene.
When U.S. forces did so-and this point cannot be
stressed too strongly- they were greeted as liberators
by an overwhelming majority of the Grenadian people.
The U.S. has subsequently promised to leave as soon as
possible and assurances have been given that free elections will be conducted as quickly as conditions permit.
All of which means that American intervention will
have resulted not in the imposition of alien domination
but in genuine self-determination for the Grenadian
people. American has not thwarted democracy in Grenada; it has made it possible.
By what kind of demented evenhandedness then (to
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America owes a dec ent respect to the views of other nations, but what responsible leader w ill allow
his foreign policy to be determined by the vagaries and structural cowardices of world opinion?

recall again Peter Berger's apposite phrase) do critics
equ ate Grenada with Afghanistan? How can they, with
fine olympian impartiality, talk and act as if there were
no moral distinctions to be made between the expansion of American interests and the expansion of Soviet
interests? Intellectual sophisticates may understandably have wearied of cold war rhetoric, but it is an act
of moral abnegation for them to behave as if no preference need be indicated between the values of the western democratic tradition and those of Marxism-Leninism. We need harbor no illusions of our own virtue to
be realists about the evil of the Communist system.
Right-wing extremists often make exaggerated claims
concerning a loss of will in the liberal West, but when
one encounters as often as one does the kind of moral
confusion that cannot tell the difference between Afghanistan and Grenada, one begins to wonder if they do not
have a point.
Nonetheless, it is said, we must pay heed to international pieties, however mindless we may find them
to be. The principle of non-intervention has been elevated into an absolute standard, as was indicated by the
overwhelming vote in the United Nations General
Assembly deploring American intervention in Grenada. (It is depressing but not surprising that the vote
against America was more decisive than the U.N.'s
earlier vote criticizing the Soviets over Afghanistan.)
Even America's European allies, who presumably
ought to know better, were anything but enthusiastic
over the Grenadian intervention. Critics therefore
argue that whatever the intrinsic merits of the Grenadian operation, it must be counted as a blunder because
of its cost to America's international reputation.
Certainly America owes a decent respect to the views
of other nations , but what responsible leader will allow
his foreign policy to be determined by the vagaries and
structural cowardices of world opinion? To make decisions according to the vector of forces of international
opinion is to commit oneself to a policy of perpetual
inactivity. America's allies fluctuate between general
urgings that we display steadiness of will and specific
pleadings that we never in any particular situation do
anything to upset anyone. But there is more to foreign
policy than avoiding the untoward .
Which brings us to the question of whether Grenada
represents a dangerous militarization of American
foreign policy. It is possible to acknowledge that as a
genuine concern, but it is difficult to see that we need
at present be alarmed. Except to those of a pacifist persuasion, power is a necessary and enduring element in
international relations, and it encompasses, on occasion, the use of military force. America is not Switzerland. Our international responsibilities require of us
the measured use of force in the pursuit and defense of
4

values for which history has made us trustee. If we exercise that power recklessly, the world will come to hate
and fear us, but if we refrain from using it where appropriate, the world will hold us in polite contempt.
Debating abstractions concerning the use of power
will get us nowhere. We need to focus on particular
cases. In Grenada, we used limited force in such a manner and in such a cause that the great majority of people
on the spot applauded our actions. It is odd, to say the
least, that the opinion of those directly affected should
be taken to count for less than that of critics with no
direct stake in the outcome. Consider just for a moment
how radically our attitudes toward Afghanistan would
change if we had reason to believe that the people there
welcomed the Soviet invaders.
There is no point in generalizing from the Grenadian
success or in making more of it than is called for. What
made sense there would not necessarily do so in El Salvador or Nicaragua. But Grenada did perhaps send certain useful signals. The Russians, Cubans, and North
Koreans, all of whom had established arms and training
agreements with the former Grenadian government,
may have learned that military meddling in America's
back yard carries risks for all concerned. If our action
in Grenada in any way inhibited the growth of MarxismLeninism elsewhere in the hemisphere, then it served
a useful purpose. Force is not a substitute for diplomacy,
but it is at times a useful extension of it. So it was in
Grenada.
Finally, a tangential but important issue. The intervention in Grenada took place under a press black-out.
The media not only missed the first landings; they had
to wait for at least two full days afterward to gain access
to the island. That was a mistake. We appreciate fully
the need for secrecy in military planning, and we can
understand the desire of military leaders to carry on
their affairs free from the second-guessing of the press.
But press coverage, even when trivial, unbalanced, or
unfair, is part of the price of operating within a democracy. It can legitimately be restricted only for reasons
of milit~ry necessity. What happened in Grenada went
well beyond that, and it should not happen again.
That said, we would urge the press to consider carefully why on this issue the public has shown it so little
sympathy. The reason is obvious: the elite press has
placed itself in such an adversarial relationship to the
government that many Americans have come to see
members of the press not as bearers of truth but as instinctive and habitual opponents of those the people
have placed in power. A press that paid more attention
to gathering the news and less to acting as part of the
political opposition might find itself receiving more
trust and support from the people it claims to serve.

••
••
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Building New Jerusalem

Recent Church Statement s on War and Peace
Steven Schroeder
The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response,
approved by U.S. Roman Catholic Bishops at a special
meeting in Chicago during the first week of May, has
been widely acclaimed as the most comprehensive statement on nuclear policy formulated to date by the
Church. Much of the reaction has taken the form of
summary and/or comparison of the final draft of the
document to earlier versions. It is important to summarize this complex document, and it is instructive to
chronicle the development of the Bishops' arguments.
But, if we are to take the document seriously and accept
the Bishops' invitation to a "public moral dialogue," it
is appropriate to move beyond the bounds of the document itself by reading it along with other recent statements on war and peace issued by various Protestant
denominations and ecumenical bodies. It is neither
necessary nor possible to undertake a comprehensive
survey here; but several statements issued since October
1981 help illuminate important issues and broaden the
analysis undertaken by the Bishops in Chicago. If nothing else, this exercise should clarify common ground in
diverse approaches to the complex issues involved and
point the way for further dialogue.
In October 1981, the House of Bishops of the Episcopal Church in the United States issued a pastoral
letter entitled "Apocalypse and Hope" in which they
called on Christians to "confront the problems revealed
by the intense light of any apocalyptic moment" with a
"resurrection faith" that rises from Christ's "historic
death at the center of history." The Episcopal Bishops
pointed to growing tension and heightening anxiety in
the face of a constantly escalating arms race, then took
this situation as an occasion for proposing a broad response to crises that confront Christians and others
every day.
"Apocalypse and Hope" begins with a faith that rises
from Christ's death at the center of history and sets as
its task the redefinition of history in terms of God's act
in Christ. Apocalyptic moments-or end times-are to

Steven Schroeder is Director of Northwest Texas Clergy
and Laity Concerned. His article, "Life as Gift and Task:
Critical Reflections on the Nuclear Dilemma, " appeared in
The Cresset last January.
December, 1983

be the occasions for redefining history. In this particular moment of apocalypse, precipitated by the increasingly threatening specter of nuclear war, the Bishops
are led to the conclusions that "reason forbids the use
of violence, or the threat of it, as a means of securing
one society against another" and that "the adequacy of
spontaneous, private caring for the poor" has been outgrown. In the course of moving toward those conclusions, the Bishops redefine "security" by shifting their
focus from the nation to the totality of the human family:
"The only security available to any nation is the security
of all the nations together." They recognize that to shift
to another means of security is "an agony of growth,"
but they also recognize an obligation to make this "moral
shift."
That image of moral development in shifting from an
outmoded concept of security to one that is more adequate and more inclusive is an image of the practical
task involved in the redefinition of history.
The Council of Bishops of the United Methodist
Church, in an April 1982 pastoral letter, shared the
sense of urgency and crisis evidenced in "Apocalypse
and Hope." One issue, they tell us, transcends all others:
that of human survival. Confronted with a growing
threat to survival, the Methodist Bishops return to the
theme of the "oneness of creation," which "moves as a
demanding strand through Holy Scripture." The oneness of creation is "a demanding theme"; human survival is "a transcendent issue"; the task, according to
the Methodist Bishops, is to bring the theme to bear on
the issue. In our present moment of crisis, they see the
threat of nuclear destruction as a challenge qualitatively
different from any other, and they see eventual nuclear
disarmament as necessary for human survival.
The emphasis of the Methodist pastoral is on the
threat of destruction. The oneness of creation is cited
as a central theme, but the themes that dominate are
the threat of nuclear destruction and the imperative of
human survival. It is not clear what makes human survival "transcendent" or where the "imperative" of survival is grounded. What is clear is that we confront a
crisis (labelled "apocalypse" by the Episcopal Bishops)
and that we confront it with a vision of "the oneness of
creation."
That theme may serve as a broader version of the
"historic death at the center of history"; the oneness of
creation, in theological terms, flows from the creative
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The 1982 statement of the Lutheran Church in America attempts to offer an ethical framework that is
distinctively Lutheran. In this respect, it closely parallels the Roman Catholic Bishops' statement.

act and is sustained in the act of reconciliation.
At about the same time as the Methodist pastoral, the
council of presidents of the American Lutheran Church
issued "A Pastoral Call to Peacemaking." Again, the
call is precipitated by recognition of a crisis. The Lutheran Bishops note increasing anxiety among the people of their churches as well as the anxiety they experience themselves. They see this as an "insecurity" that
challenges our faith . In one sense, this is the other side
of the call issued by both the Episcopal and Methodist
Bishops. They see a crisis and call on their churches to
challenge it; the Lutheran Bishops point out that the
crisis challenges us, whether or not we choose to respond.
The Lutheran pastoral begins with the affirmation
that "the earth is the Lord's" and the reminder that
"the world and its people have been redeemed at a very
high price." Again, we are reminded of both creation
and reconciliation as central themes in our vision of
the world. The Lutheran Bishops move from affirmation to a recognition of a common calling and its implications: "Our common calling as agents of reconciliation compels us to work from a faith perspective." This
recalls the obligation recognized in "Apocalypse and
Hope" and challenges us to look at the present with
eyes of faith. We bring a unique perspective to the crisis
that grows directly out of our call to be "agents of reconciliation." We acknowledge God's sovereignty in Christ;
we confess our individual and corporate sins ; we raise
critical questions regarding issues that confront us ; and
we recognize peacemaking as a dynamic pursuit of
justice.
For the Lutheran Bishops, what is most crucial is the
translation of our affirmation of God as creator and redeemer into responsible action. Because we affirm God
as creator and redeemer, we act as faithful stewards of
creation and as agents of reconciliation in a broken
world.
The ALC Bishops' pastoral was expanded and
affirmed by the Church's general convention in September 1982 with adoption of a "Mandate for Peacemaking."
The Mandate begins with the Gospel proclamation of
reconciliation and with confidence in God's redemptive
activity. It moves to an affirmation of the inclusiveness
of God's Kingdom and a recognition of the Church as a
sign of reconciliation. This is a collective version of the
vocation emphasized in the Bishops' pastoral: the
Church is called to embody God's act of reconciliation
in a broken world. The Mandate emphasizes that we
confess our failures but take our role seriously, affirming the immorality of nuclear war and specifying policy,
personal, and institutional implications of that affirmation. Among the most important implications are insistence on elimination of nuclear weapons as the goal of
U .S. policy ; a call for production of liturgical, devo6

tiona! , and educational materials on peacemaking; an
insistence that pastoral concern be exercised where
individuals are struggling with these issues, regardless
of agreement or disagreement; and a church-wide
emphasis on the Mandate for at least the next five years.
The ALC document, in its call for "a mass movement
of social change," echoes a call that is emerging with
increasing insistence from churches around the world.
Another Lutheran body, the Lutheran Church in
America, prepared a statement in 1982 that is one of the
most extensive to date. The statement, "Peace and War:
Some Theological and Political Perspectives," does not
arrive at definitive answers, but it does attempt to offer
an ethical framework that is distinctively Lutheran. In
this respect, it most nearly parallels the Roman Catholic
Bishops' statement.
The document begins with revelation-in Christ, in
Scripture, and in the Church. It moves to a call to study
Scripture in the fellowship of the Church and to examine present reality with an informed conscience. For the
LCA writers, this means that our concern with war and
peace is "the love of Christ extending itself," that we
must repent and "recover our theology of the cross,"
and that we must act out of faith , not guilt or despair.
It is important to note that the bases for our actions
and the starting point for our inquiry are central to all
of these documents. There is unanimity on the point
that we must act in faith and hope rather than in despair.
The. LCA document offers several alternative explanations for our predicament and suggests that, regardless of which is espoused, five "underlying dynamics"
can be identified: first, lack of trust between adversaries
in arms races ; second, misperceptions on all sides that
feed the spiral; third, political methods for controlling
conflict that have not kept pace with technical modes of
warfare ; fourth, destabilizing effects of new technologies
that are recognized only in retrospect ; and fifth, relations
between individual behavior and systemic global problems that, because they are not self-evident, breed frustration and a sense of impotence.
It defines war as "violent conflict between parties in
which one attempts to force the other to conform to its
will" and peace as "harmony between parties." "Temporal peace," according to the LCA document, is "the
fruit of justice," while "eternal peace" is "the gift of
faith."
Three traditions on war and peace are explored m
some detail : pacifism, just war, and the Crusade.
According to the LCA writers, a kind of pacifism prevailed in the early church which was " never thought
out." It represented "the practical stance of a persecuted
Church." The pacifism of the Radical Reformation , on
the other hand, was a confessional position. Adherence
to this position was seen as an article of faith . The paciThe Cresset

The LCA document emphasizes that we must resist the popular notion that we have opened a
Pandora 's box and are innoc ent victims of a technology that has taken on a life of its own.

fism of Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and the Quakers is seen as "a strategy in the service of a political
goal." The cumulative effect of these characterizations
is to dismiss the idea that pacifism is a necessary part of
the Christian faith (the position of the Radical Reformation) and admit the idea that pacifism may be an appropriate political strategy, especially for a persecuted
Church.
Just-war theory is described as a Roman doctrine deriving from Cicero designed to minimize the possibility
of rebellion, legitimate the action of the Roman government, and preserve the status quo. With its adoption by
St. Ambrose, the issue became who defines "just." That
issue, of course, continued to be central in the applications of the doctrine by Augustine and Aquinas. The
LCA writers point out that Luther's attitude toward war
and peace was not based on the just-war approach but on
what they refer to as the "One God's Two Rules" (more
commonly, tJ-wugh perhaps less accurately, referred to
as the Two Kingdoms doctrine). They conclude that
the doctrine of just war is neither r ight nor wrong, but
useless.
The third tradition on war and peace, that of the
Crusade, is dismissed as a "gross aberration ," the "epitome of triumphalistic Christendom." The LCA writers
note that, in Old Testament thought, Holy War was
seen as God's war with Israel 's participation . The Crusade, on the other hand, was war on God's behalf. The
Crusade is idolatrous by nature, because it is based on
despair of God's power and a seizing of that power in an
attempt to rescue or protect it. The LCA writers are
quick to note the relation between just-war theory and
the Crusade. The theory served to justify the "gross
aberration" of Christian triumphalism. This is one
reason why just-war theory was useless even before the
nuclear age.
The LCA writers draw on Luther to offer a fourth
alternative, that of the "One God's Two Rules." In our
present situation, this is embodied in the fact that "our
hope is that Christ, not Moscow or Washington, is
sovereign." The idea is not to separate this world from
another or to render "temporal" actions irrelevant in
"eternal" terms: it is to emphasize God's sovereignty in
both temporal and eternal affairs . "Where we see powers
authorizing themselves [i.e. , becoming absolute] we are
authorized to make them temporal again ."
The LCA document emphasizes that we must r esist
the popular notion that we have opened a Pandora's
box and are innocent victims of a technology that has
taken on a life of its own. "We have bought our prosperity with these armaments .... " We must repent. It
also emphasizes that we must rediscover our theology
of the cross : God esteems u s in Christ on account of
God's own act. Finally, it emphasizes that we must act
December, 1983

not out of guilt or drivenness or despair, but out of
faith. The Church is always recalled as a basis for peacemaking, as a community that underlies and sustains our
action.
"The Christian faith," we are told, "does not offer a
solution to the problem of power; it authorizes the godly
use of power." The only norm is the "law of faith ."
An important European perspective on the issue is
offered in a statement of the Federation of Reformed
Churches in the Federal Republic of Germany, "The
Confession of Jesus Christ and the Church's Responsibility for Peace," issued in June 1982. This statement
begins with the assertion that "the nuclear preparation
for universal holocaust is no 'adiaphoron' [someth ing
that is morally neutral]; it is done in contradiction to
the basic articles of the Christian creed." This, of course,
places the document very close to the approach of the
Radical Reformation dismissed by the LCA writers.
Christ's peace, the Reformed writers tell us, liberates
us and obligates us to work for peace among all people;
"one's position on the means of mass destruction has to
do with confession or denial of the gospel." In Christ,
God has given peace to all people; this recognition is
the order we should affirm. Weapons of mass destruction deny it. God creates and preserves the world; construction of weapons of mass destruction opposes this
creation and preservation. In Christ, God connects
peace and justice; this is incompatible with a "security"
system built and sustained on the backs of the poor.
Christ is Lord; this limits the power of the state. Hope
in Christ is incompatible with hopelessness and passivity
in the face of the threat. God's promise of reconciliation
is incompatible with aimless activism, all blasphemous
speculations about the "end-times," and all political
indifference to issues of peace and justice.
The Reformed document obviously shares some important themes with other Church documents already
cited. Our action is based on the revelation and the action of God in Christ; God's sovereignty limits the
sovereignty of temporal powers; our action must be on
the basis of faith and hope, not despair. One question
that the statement raises, especially when it is read with
the Lutheran statements just discussed, is how we talk
about articles of faith and the implications of how we
talk . No one disputes the centrality and importance of
the issue; there is, however, some strong objection to
classifying it as an article of faith .
Another important perspective is the message of the
Christian World Conference on Life and Peace which
was prepared in Uppsala, Sweden in April 1983. Although this document came from Europe, it would not
be strictly accurate to call it a European perspective.
The conference that produced it included 150 church
leaders from 62 countries. This gives it an ecumenical
7
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breadth that is unique in the documents being considered here. It represents a real attempt to give voice
to the emerging consensus evidenced in statements like
those already discussed. At the same time, it sheds light
on some of the sticking points.
The Uppsala document begins with an acknowledgment of differences and unanimously declares that "life
in abundance, and the peace which is the fruit of justice,
are gifts God offers through Christ to all humankind."
Institu tionalized violence, we are told, holds the world
in bondage. We proclaim a gospel of peace in a world
of violence.
Nuclear weapons signal "a new age of terror." Their
production and the threat to use them "demonstrates
an u ltimate arrogance before God who alone disposes
of life and death." The problem, again, is one of faith;
the issue is that of idolatry.
As in "Apocalypse and Hope," this time is referred
to as a "crucial juncture." As in the pastoral letter of the
Methodist Bishops, we are reminded that the gospel, in
addition to being a message of life, peace, hope, and
love, is a message of judgment. We are called to bring
that message to bear on the present situation, and we are
reminded that God brings it to bear whether we do or
not: "God judges the present world order which causes
and sustains extensive misery and produces an increasing sense of insecurity."
We are not led to believe that nuclear weapons are
merely a threat. This document clearly focuses on present reality: "millions die, not only in military conflicts,
but because they are denied the basic necessities of life."
But equally real is the existence of the unity of the
Church as a sign over against the division of the world.
Our nuclear madness is a future threat and a present
reality; the hope of salvation is a future promise and
a present sign.
"The Scriptures," we are reminded, "teach that peace
and justice are inseparably linked." To work for peace
is to work for justice, for economic sys~ems which "both
care for and equitably distribute the earth's resources"
and for political systems within which all can participate "in regaining, preserving and enhancing of their
rights and dignity as beings created in the image of
God." We are to pay as much attention to North/South
as to East/West tensions.
This document articulates the unanimous point, the
consensus among church members and church leaders
that is becoming increasingly clear, that "nuclear war-.
fare ... can never be justified." Nuclear warfare is conderimed; this raises the question of its threat: "The current military and political doctrine of nuclear deterrence must be challenged." This document is able to
go so far as to say that "most of us believe that ... reliance upon the threat and possible use of nuclear weap8

ons is unacceptable as a way of avoiding war." The consensus against waging nuclear war is not yet a consensus
against threatening to wage it. Some "are willing to
tolerate nuclear deterrence .. . as a temporary measure
in the absence of alternatives."
The question of deterrence is critical. It again raises
questions about how we articulate our faith and the implications of that articulation. "Nuclear deterrence,"
the Uppsala document tells us, "is essentially dehumanizing, it increases fear and hatred, and entrenches confrontation." Most of those who signed the document
agreed that "the existence of these weapons contradicts
the will of God"; all agreed that God's will "demands a
resolute effort within a specified time limit for their
total elimination."
Like "Apocalypse and Hope," the Uppsala document
redefines security as common security. That move toward a more inclusive definition of security parallels
the unanimous rejection of nuclear war as a morally
defensible option.
The U ppsala document concludes that "Christian
people not only want peace, they are required to make
peace. That means that for the churches there is no
escape from political involvement. ... " Christ's peace
obligates us to work for peace among all people.
It should be clear by now that The Challenge of Peace
stands in a context of carefully articulated reflection on
contemporary issues of war and peace that has come
from a broad range of church bodies and a number of
theological traditions. Especially in the Uppsala document, we see the beginnings of a synthesis that is truly
catholic and ecumenical. The Challenge of Peace should
be read not so much as a synthesis or culmination of
theological reflection but as a contribution to a lively
theological discussion. That, of course, is precisely what
the Bishops said when they adopted it.
Underlying the whole document is Vatican II's call
"to undertake a completely fresh reappraisal of war." In
a sense, that call underlies the broader discussion as
well. There has been a growing consciousness across
denominational lines and theological traditions of a
need to redefine history and to reassess our approach to
crises and conflicts.
The Roman Catholic Bishops recognize, like other
Church leaders, that the human race faces a moment of
crisis. The human race is seen as advancing toward
maturity, and the nuclear threat is viewed in the context of that advance. Growing fear and apprehension
about nuclear war is evidence that the world is in a moment of crisis, but the letter is written out of hope:
"Ultimately our hope rests in the God who gave us life,
sustains the world by his power and has called us to
revere the lives of every person and all peoples."
For the Roman Catholic Bishops, this moment of
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crisis blends fear and hope into a realization of responsibility given voice by John Paul II at Hiroshima:
"From now on it is only through a conscious choice and
through a deliberate policy that humanity can survive."
This pastoral letter is intended as "an invitation" and
"a challenge" to Roman Catholics in the U .S., but it is
also "a contribution to a wider common effort meant to
call Catholics and all members of our political community to dialogue and specific decisions about this awesome question."
In general, the approach espoused by the Bishops is
one of taking universal moral principles and applying
them to specific contemporary issues. They look for
"prudential judgments . . . based on specific circumstances." They expect "a certain diversity of views even
though all hold the same universal moral principles."
It would appear that the Bishops require agreement on
moral principles but allow diversity in interpretation
of contemporary situations and in application of principles to those situations.
That general approach is followed by a seemingly
innocuous statement that may well be the most significant insight of the whole document: "Not only conviction and commitment are needed in the church, but also
civility and charity." All four of those elements-conviction, commitment, civility, and charity-need to be
adequately developed.
At the center of this document lie two principles:
"the transcendence of God" and "the dignity of the
human person." Like all Catholic teaching on war and
peace, the document has two purposes: "to help Catholics form their consciences" and "to contribute to the
public policy debate about the morality of war."
According to the Bishops' own outline of the document, it consists of a sketch of the Biblical conception of
peace, a theological understanding of how peace can be
pursued in a world marked by sin, a moral assessment
of key issues, and an assessment of political and personal
tasks.
In looking at the Biblical conception of peace, the
Bishops remind us that peace is understood in different
ways in different contexts and that the Bible reflects a
wide variety of historical situations. Regardless of context, however, peace and war must always be seen in the
light of God's intervention and our response. In the Old
Testament, peace is seen as a gift, the "fruit of God's
saving activity." It is a restoration of "right order . . .
within all of creation," and it is always understood in
terms of fidelity to the covenant. In the New Testament,
the actions of Jesus are a sign of God's action in the
world; following Jesus implies "continual conversion ."
Because we have been "gifted with God's peace in the
risen Christ, we are called to our own peace and to the
making of peace in our world."
December, 1983

This recalls the distinction made earlier in the LCA
document between the eternal peace which is God's free
gift and the temporal peace which is the fruit of justice.
We are given peace in the risen Christ, but at the same
time we are called to do justice because of that gift. Obviously, both forms of peace depend on God's action
and are God's gift; but "Christians are called to live the
tension between the vision of the reign of God and its
concrete realization in history."
We proclaim a gospel of peace in a world of violence,
because "peace is both a gift of God and a human work."
According to the Roman Catholic Bishops, "the issue
of war and peace confronts everyone with a basic question: What contributes to and what impedes the construction of a more genuinely human world?" What we
are about is the construction of a more genuinely human world. This is why, as the Uppsala document points
out, the issue before us is as much a North/South as an
East/West question.
The Church's teaching, we are told, "establishes a
strong presumption against war," then "examines when
the presumption may be overriden . . . ." The Roman
Catholic Bishops join the consensus against nuclear
war, but they also join the debate about the threat of
nuclear war. We face a paradox, the Bishops tell us:
"we must continue to articulate our belief that love is
possible and the only real hope for all human relations,
and yet accept that force, even deadly force, is sometimes justified and that nations must provide for their
defense." Three presumptions bind all Christians in
approaching this issue: "We should do no harm to our
neighbors; how we treat our enemy is the key test of
whether we love our neighbor; and the possibility of
taking even one human life is a prospect we should
consider in fear and trembling."
According to the Roman Catholic Bishops, it is examination of when the presumption against war may be
overriden that gives rise to just-war theory, which considers not only when resort to force is justifiable but also
how resort to force may be conducted. "Faced with the
fact of attack on the innocent, the presumption that we
do no harm even to our enemy yields to the command
of love understood as the need to restrain an enemy who
would injure the innocent."
The question of "when" is answered in the form of
jus ad bellum criteria: there must be a just cause; decision
must be made by a competent authority; decision must
be made on the basis of comparative justice ("no state
should act on the basis that it has 'absolute justice' on its
side"); there must be right intention; it must be a last
resort; there must be some probability of success; and
the harm done must be proportional to the benefit expected. The question of "how" is answered in the form
of jus in bello criteria: the harm done must be propor9

Just war theory is neither right nor wrong but useless. One has to suspect that it retrospectively
justifies a decision rather than providing a basis on which the decision can initially be made.

tiona! to the benefit expected, and there must be discrimination between combatants and noncombatants.
The R oman Catholic Bishops are able to use those
criteria as the basis for joining the consensus against
nuclear war. This is, incidentally, the same basis used
by most of the other church bodies that join the consensus. But the criteria do not serve as a basis for consensus
against the threat of nuclear war and the arms race it is
built on. This recalls the contention of the LCA writers
that just-war theory is neither right nor wrong but useless. One has to suspect that it retrospectively justifies
a decision rather than providing a basis on which the
decision can be made.
T he Bishops decide on "a strictly conditioned moral
acceptance of nuclear deterrence" as "a step on the way
toward a progressive disarmament. " This, of course , is
where the consensus almost reached by the U ppsala Conference breaks down . The Roman Catholic Bishops call
what we have now "peace of a sort." This, along with
the difficulty, shared by all of the documents cited, in
rejecting the threat as well as the act of nuclear war
clarifies the critical question of deterrence. The fundamental question is whether we are now dealing with a
threat of war or an act of war.
The arms race, the Roman Catholic Bishops tell us,
is "an act of aggression against the poor. " All the documents cited agree that the threat of nuclear war is raising anxiety and fear to an unprecedented level throughout the human family (a point substantiated by psychological literature). What is this fear and anxiety if
not evidence of a pervasive and destructive psychological warfare? We are already dealing with an act of
aggression; we must decide how to deal with the aggressor.
The Roman Catholic Bishops end with St. John's
vision of a "New Jerusalem." If that vision is to be more
than a pious dream, the Church will have to be more
serious and consistent about its commitment to "civility." What we are about is building the New J erusalem
and learning to live in it.
That ending is the best criticism of the general approach of the Bishops' pastoral and the best starting
point for building beyond it. The Bishops look for
general principles to apply in specific situations; this
may be connected theologically with a transcendent
God as starting point. I suggest that what we have is an
incarnate God, an immanent God, and principles that
have meaning only in specific situations. We have concrete situations, not abstract principles; and what binds
the situ ations together is not a transcendent God standing apart from them, but a living vision, a God who
dwells with humankind, a God who makes things new.
It is not an accident that the vision is the heavenly
city, because in understanding any issue (not just peace
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and war) the key is seeing it in terms of God's intervention and our response. More to the point, it is our response to the issue, to one another, to our world-issues ,
"others," and worlds in which we affirm God's presence
as a given-that matters. It is that response, that way of
being in the world, that needs to be sh aped and nurtured . We don't need abstract principles about which to
argue or agree; we need ways of being in the world that
make it a more human place, ways that embody God's
presence and re-present the love of Christ "extending
itself."
Forming a conscience and building character- both
of which are time-honored aspects of R oman Catholic
moral thought-have less to do with abstract or general
principles than with style or vision. We are edu cating
ourselves and our children in the art of seeing the world
with the eyes of faith.
That art is the most unique - and the most useful gift we as Christians can bring to the public policy deCl
bate on nuclear weapons issues.

A Gift from the Wilds Denied
In my dream I learn to love
the touch of his resiny fur,
rough
against my fingertips,
the smell of trees and dried leaves
seasoned
to a wild pungency.
In my dream I ease to the feel
of this woodland creature
seeking safety on my lap.
I breathe
to the rhythms of his breath,
and wonder
at his tender heart,
his soulful trust.
Then in my dream I am seized:
fear of the beast overtakes me.
I drive at night to wood's edge
and leave him there.
Dismay
stares from his soft, wild eyes.
In the silence of his shocked farewell,
he names my fear betrayal.
And in my dream I weep.

Ruth El Saffar
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A Model for Christian Higher Education

The Free Christian College
Donald G. Luck
The intersection of the Church. and the Academy
reaches back to some of the earliest periods of Christian
history. The establishment of a Christian (albeit Gnostic)
Academy in the intellectual center of Alexandria by
Basilides in the early second century and St. Augustine's
goal in the fourth century of creating a monastic community dedicated equally to intellectual reflection and
prayer are interesting examples. In the case of the former, one finds a tangible expression of interest within
the Church to move into the arena of the Academy and
meet it on its own grounds. In the case of the latter, one
finds a concern to bring the work of the Academy into
the life of the Church itself. So too Charlemagne's establishment of a system of schools under the direction of
the Benedictine order and Melanchthon's efforts in
creating the public educational system of Germany concretely express the Church's interest in sponsoring
secular education.
A uniquely American realization of this intersection
is the emergence of church-related colleges and universities. The removal of the Church from state sponsorship and the wide reaches of immigration resulted in a
religious pluralism in America. The Church came to be
understood in the paradigmatically American form of
"denominations." As these denominations had to find
their way amidst the challenges and plurality of American culture, they found it advantageous to establish
colleges and universities.
The reasons for these schools are as diverse as their
sponsoring denominations. One conscious aim was to
provide newly immigrant peoples with occupational
and civic skills, thereby assisting assimilation into the
wider culture. Founding colleges was one way denominations helped their members join the American mainstream. A rather different aim was the concern to rescue
the special identity of these immigrants from the process
of assimilation. 1 Often national or ethnic identity was
closely aligned with denominational identity; concern
to preserve the one usually entailed concern to preserve
the other. Institutions of higher education assisted the
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process. A third reason was that of providing an educated leadership for the sponsoring denomination. It
was thought that the continuing denominational participation and loyalty of this leadership could best be
preserved by linking education with church sponsorship. A somewhat different aim was the interest of the
sponsoring denomination in providing civil leadership
in the wider secular community. It was thought that
church-educated persons were a means through which
that denomination could have a dominant role in shaping American society. A final reason, which surfaced
only occasionally but which proved significant, was the
use of their colleges by certain denominations as instruments of mission, making them advocates for social
criticism and reform.
In short, religious pluralism in America-the presence of different and sometimes competing churches,
and their equally different and sometimes conflicting
understandings of the relation between church and culture-has given rise to church-sponsored institutions
of higher education founded for a variety of purposes.
These purposes reflect the special social and theological forces within the sponsoring denominations.
But these special origins place a special burden of
interpretation on these institutions. The vigorous presence of public and non-sectarian schools has challenged
these church-sponsored institutions to explain themselves. The differing character and aims of supporting
denominations has made their schools self-conscious
about their identities. And debate within churches
about continuing support of colleges and universities
has drawn these institutions into the discussions. The
upshot of all this has been to make these colleges and
universities ask what their historical church relation
means in the present.
In 1973, a centennial study commission at St. Olaf
College published a report which faced the question of
that institution's identity. Interestingly, the report
argued that all institutions have four identities. The
first is a "constitutive" identity which reflects its charter
and special features. The second is its "contingent"
identity which expresses what in fact the institution has
become but which it need not have become. Third is its
"empirical" identity which describes the current character of the institution, including the changes and
trends taking place. But finally, and importantly, is its
1

See Michael Novak , The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics (New York:
MacMillan, 1973 ) and his briefer a nalysis , "The One and the Many ,"
Daedalus(FaJJ , 1974), pp. 203-21 1.
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"intentional" identity which expresses the institution's
hopes and goals. At stake is what the institution aims at
becoming. 2 It is the question of intentional identity, a
model or vision of church-relation, that established the
focus of this paper. But in addressing this question most
fruitfully, I believe, we must distinguish between two
clusters of concerns about that identity.
The first cluster centers on the issue of church sponsorship itself. Churches ask why they need involve themselves in an enterprise long after state and private
agencies are willing and able to do so. They ask what
advantages exist for them long after the original purposes of their colleges have been met or abandoned.
They ask if they ought to allocate their limited resources
toward providing an expanded campus ministry program at state and non-sectarian private institutions.
As important as this issue of church sponsorship is ,
I believe that priority must be given to another cluster
of questions. They center on the issue of how the Christian community evaluates education as such, not just
how it views the sponsorship of education. This evaluation of education emerges out of the Church's own selfunderstanding; it is a matter of theology, not just educational strategy. Only a theological evaluation of education can provide the churches with a framework
adequate for reviewing their sponsorship of institutions
of higher learning. Only a theological evaluation of
education can provide the framework adequate for instituting review of their intentional identity as colleges
of the Church.
The basic issue is what it means to say, from a theological point of view, that a particular institution is a

expressed themselves in the constitution and selfinterpretation of church-related colleges and universities in the United States. They provide the germ for
this investigation of church colleges' intentional identity.
The first model noted by the report is "the defender
of the faith " college. Such a college operates on the theological assumption that the sponsoring denomination
is in tension, if not in outright conflict, with the general
culture. Its central interest is in training leadership for
the church itself. Not surprisingly, the report argues,
such a college has a faculty and a student body who
identify deeply with the sponsor's tradition and maintain close connection with it. If one looks for examples,
one might point to Oral Roberts University or to Bethel
College.
The second model is "the non-affirming" college.
Such institutions have only nominal and historical
connections with their founding churches. In life and
curriculum there is little attention paid to religion in
general, even less to the concrete tradition which stands
behind the institution. Such an institution- Yale or
Carleton, for example-offers little attraction to either
faculty or student body on religious grounds.
A third model the report calls "the church-related
university." Here the connection between denomination
and institution is somewhat diffuse and tenuous, the
university being loosely related and yet hospitable to
the church and its needs. Examples would include Fordham or Duke.
But of particular interest is the report's fourth model ,
that of "the free Christian college." In such an institution, the Danforth report notes, there is no attempt to

college of the Church, not merely one nostalgically r e -

control the beliefs of faculty or student body, yet a def-

lated to a particular denomination . A theological understanding of the intersection of the Aca.d emy and the
Church can help us understand how an institution's
identity as an educational one can be viewed as an expression of the Church itself, or of the mission of the
Church, albeit in a very special form and in a very delimited sense.
Some helpful distinctions for church-related higher
education surfaced in 1971 with the publication of a
report by the Danforth Foundation. 3 That report argues
it is crucial to the well-being and even to the survival of
church-related colleges that they have an indigenous
self-understanding, one which consciously reflects their
church background, rather than one which merely borrows secular patterns of identity and purpose. In that
connection, it outlines four general models that have

inite commitment to the theological and ecclesiastical
origins of the school is fostered. In such an institution,
most members of the faculty either outrightly share the
religious purposes and concerns of the institution or are
agreeable to working within their framework.
This model of a "free Christian college" is worth exploring for a number of reasons. In the first place, it
can help us move beyond the sociological and accidental
character of "church-relatedness" toward a model of
intentional identity. If institutions of higher education
are only church-related, then their connection to the
Christian community expresses contingent identity
only ; theoretically it could be set aside. Second, determining what a "Christian" college or "Christian" higher
education might mean could provide a concrete alternative in higher education. It carries a potential contribution to the larger Academy in a day when colleges
and universities feel pressures to become more and
more the same. Third, the Christian community-and
American culture, for that matter-has vested interest
in the outcome of such an exploration. Ours is a time

2
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Council on Education , 1966 ).
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when fundamentalism is attempting to pre-empt the
term "Christian" for itself and its narrow purposes, a
time when it is presenting our culture with a particular
model of what it calls "Christian education ." A concerted
effort to understand and implement the model of a
"free Christian college," therefore, provides a crucial
alternative for the church, church members , and American society as a whole.
What follows is my proposal of what such a model
might mean. It begins with a theological evaluation of
the Academy.
II

My basic argument is that Christian theology should
recognize the genuinely religious significance of the
Academy in its own right independent of the Church.
At the same time it should insist that this religious significance is not self-derived or self-validating on the
part of the Academy. The Academy needs neither
Church sponsorship nor Church approval in order to
have an ultimate integrity and meaning of its own. At
the same time, the Church should argue-even if the
Academy won't-that this integrity and meaning are
given to the Academy, they are not generated by it.
This may sound either grandiose or outlandish. It is
meant to be neither. The work of the Academy is the
work of finite and fallible human beings. They are persons who seek to communicate insight and specific
skills, to advance the frontiers of human understanding,
to witness to the liberating effects of rational analysis ,
to exemplify and train others in the processes of reflection and criticism so that appearances and plausibilities
can be wisely and relentlessly examined.
But from a theological point of view these tasks are
human responses to the call of God , as limited and broken and ambiguous as they may be. Whether the Academy sees itself that way or not, Christian theology sees
it responding to the God who is the author of all being,
the source of all responsibility and delight, the horizon
of the future, the final evaluator of all achievement, the
origin for the claims of truthfulness and self-criticism ,
the one who calls human beings to be the images of his
creativity. The Academy has ultimate significance because in its own way, it is responding to God.
Such an overarching assertion has some immediate
implications. It means first , as I have noted , that the
Academy has an ultimate value independent from the
Church. The connectedness of the Academy to God
apart from the life of the Church provides theologt'cal
reasons why the Academy should not be subject to
external restriction or control, not even the control of
the Church. Human thought and inquiry should remain
open in all directions, pursuing insight and critical
December, 1983

understanding wherever they lead. By placing itself
under the claims of truth, the Academy is responding
to the impact of God on human life and consciousness.
The Church dare not interfere with this process.
This is a fundamental difference between a free Christian college and a "defender of the faith college." Underlying the former is a theology which sees the hallmark of life in Christ as freedom-not a cheap or casual
freedom, but one marked by the sign of the cross. Such
a theology argues that in Christ God refuses to violate
human freedom. He accepts human beings in their freedom and meets them there. He establishes and maintains relation with persons even in the misuse of their
freedom. And, as Saint Paul argues again and again, the
renewal of life through Christ is a life of renewed freedom. Through grace persons are enabled to reach out,
to risk themselves, to grow. Growth in grace t's freedom.
It encourages maturity : increasing creativity, increasing responsibility, and increasing relatedness with
others.
Such theology does not assume that academic freedom automatically liberates people or results in deeper
insight into the truth. But encouraging students and
scholars toward a more mature life corresponds with
maximizing intellectual freedom. Moreover, because
this theology links academic freedom to the freedom of
divine grace, it accepts the possibility that human freedom can be mistaken. A free Christian college is not a
contradiction in terms. It must be free if it takes seriously
the Gospel of divine grace incarnated in Christ.
For the same reasons the Church has continually interested itself in liberal arts education. Such education
is called "liberal" because it is believed that it "liberates"
persons. It enables them to think about issues, and in
new ways, that would not be the case apart from such
education. It aims at freeing people from unwarranted
opinions by enabling them to think critically in great
numbers of directions. It liberates by encouraging persons to be more mature, that is, to become more responsiblE<, more self-directing. Little wonder, then, that a
Church which sees God's purpose in Christ as one of
freedom has encouraged liberal arts education.
For these theological reasons, the Church must not
restrict or control the Academy. The Christian community, moreover, is itself finite and fallible. Even
though that to which the Church points-namely, God
-is ultimate, the Church is not. Hence it has no right
to control anything or hold any feature of human culture answerable to itself. In witnessing to God, it brings
itself as well as culture under judgment and reveals the
ultimate meaning and fulfillment of both. Here, too, is
a basic theological difference which distinguishes a free
Christian college from a defender of the faith college.
But the argument here is a qualified one. Christian
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theology argues that the Academy has a religious value
independent of the Church, but it does not see the
Academy as a merely human enterprise answerable to
nothing but itself. On the contrary, it argues, nothing
in human experience and activity is self-grounding or
self-justifying. All comes from God, belongs to him,
interacts with him, is judged by him, and finds fulfillment and blessing in him. Both Academy and Church
represent limited human responses to that which is
greater than human beings. And their responses are
"fallen." Claims to ultimate self-justification and selfdirection by either Academy or Church are idolatrous.
When the Academy assumes it grounds and judges
itself, it needs the criticism of the Church. The Church
has a prophetic role in reminding the Academy of its
own derived and responsive nature, its limitations and
brokenness. But it also has a priestly role in confirming
the ultimate value of the Academy's concerns and
achievements , especially when the Academy loses confidence in itself or is attacked from without.
On the other hand, to the extent to which the Church
becomes imperialistic and absolutistic, it needs the
criticism of the Academy. For example, the Academy's
recognition of "learned ignorance," that is, its insistence
on the tentative and partial character of all knowledge,
can become prophetic criticism of the Church's tendency to absolutize itself and its affirmations. And the
ability of the Academy to open the human mind and
spirit to new avenues of appreciation and awareness
plays a priestly role in reminding the Church of the
essential goodness of life.
In sum, because it sees the religious significance of
the Academy, the Christian community has endorsed
and even sponsored liberal arts education.
1) Learning is valued for its capacity for providing
persons with occupational and civic skills through
which they can lead productive lives, work as cocreators with God-reflecting his creativity and
goodness-and concretely serve their neighbors.
2) Free intellectual inquiry is valued for its ability to
break the bondage of absolutisms, prejudice, and
superstition. It expresses what it means to love the
truth for its own sake, not just its avowed utility.
It demonstrates that human beings stand under the
truth; they do not have it at their disposal.
3) Liberal arts education is valued for its capacity for
opening persons to the wide vistas of human
achievement and inquiry, eliciting delight and
appreciation.
Historically, both Lutheranism and liberal Protestantism make important contributions to this argument.
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Lutheranism's doctrine of "the two kingdoms," fraught
as it is with dangers and inadequacies, has the virtue of
confirming the unmediated relation of the secular to
God. In other words, it assumes that the secular does not
require the endorsement or intervention of the Church
in order to be responsive to God or be valuable to him.
One implication of this view is the Lutheran understanding of "Christian vocation" which pointed people
away from monasteries and convents and toward the
homespun and manifold tasks found in the secular
world.
But another consequence of this view has been the
Lutheran insistence on the ""technical autonomy" of
secular life. This means that persons, either totally uninformed by the Gospel or thoroughly indifferent to it,
are perfectly capable of understanding and shaping and
improving human existence in the secular world. And
they can do so in a way that is fully pleasing to Godwhether or not they know it or care about it.
Being a Christian, Lutheran theology argues, provides no advantage whatsoever in the arenas of secular
competence. For example, there is no such thing as a
"Christian" cure for cancer, nor is there a "Christian"
solution to the problems of the Middle East. (Although
as I shall argue later, there is a Christian perspective on
or evaluation of various human proposals.) And so, in
looking fora brain surgeon-or a president-one should
not look for one who is a believing Christian (despite
current trends in American politics) but one who is
competent. Who wants to be under the knife or the
governance of a devout believer if he also happens to be
a bumbling fool? By implication, the Academy has an
integrity and value of its own apart from the Church.
In addition, liberal Protestantism has been able to
acknowledge that religiously significant values have
been generated and will continue to be so by spiritual
forces outside the Christian community. It has been able
to see the contributions not only of non-Christian religious traditions but also of cultural movements which
have neither direct nor indirect sponsorship by the
Church. Such spiritually formative contributions would
include the so-called "Rights of Man," the movements
toward democratization of life, the affirmation and protection of the individual, and-yes-the value of unfettered intellectual inquiry.
The religious value accorded to the Academy by
liberal Protestantism is most clearly attested to by its
willingness to submit the Scriptures to the full rigors of
intellectual inquiry-even to the point of being the
prime sponsor of that inquiry. That is an amazing development which is without parallel not only in Christian history but the history of other religions. It too
shows how the Church has been able to recognize and
respect the inherent integrity of the Academy and the
The Cresset
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validity of its work apart from the Church.
If the Academy does have genuinely religious significance independent of the Church, and I strongly
believe it does, it means that a church-related college
should never let its concerns for the spirituality of its
students, for their personal well-being and adjustment,
or for the conscious affirmation of its own heritage displace or take priority over its fundamental relation to
the Academy. It is not the first task of a church-related
college to be a worshipping community; it is not the
first task of a church-related college to be a caring community; it is not the first task of a church-related college
to be a tradition-conscious community. These have
importance. But it is the first task of a church-related
college to be an academic community. If that is not made
consistently clear, if that does not guide such a college's
policies and blueprints, if that does not form the basic
motivation of its administration and faculty , then it not
only betrays that college's relation to the Academy but
also defaults on its relation to the Church.
Because the Church sees that the Academy has religious significance, a church-related college should be
an institution which is conscious of that significance and
seeks to shape its priorities, policies, and program in its
light. Its faculty and student body are called first and
foremost to the vocation of the intellectual life- its
discipline and ferment, its discomfiture and delight. To
do less than that is to deny the claims of the God whom
the Church confesses is Truth itself and Being itself,
the one who creates and grounds intellect and life.
Theological endorsement of the Academy needs
qualification, however. From its relationship to God's
self-disclosure, the Church is able to see the limitations
and self-deception found in the Academy. The task of
Christian theology (and, therefore , part of the task of a
free Christian college) is to engage in something equivalent to "investigative reporting." It needs to unmask
the pretentious of the Academy and its denial of or indifference to its own ultimate foundations .
Over against claims to "objectivity" and "value-free
inquiry," the Church needs to argue that there is no such
thing as inquiry that can be totally divorced from the
human concerns, interest, and assumptions of the inquirers. "Value-free inquiry," for example, often reflects value-laden assumptions about the nature of reality, knowledge, and humanity, which are neither selfevident nor uncontestable. The results of seemingly
"objective" inquiry, moreover, need to be arranged in
priority in regard to their relative importance to the
expenditure of human energy and attention.
In addition, the unfettered inquiry which the Academy espouses in arguing against church control has
often meant tacitly a climate of inquiry consciously
indifferent-even hostile-to the Church. That is not
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truly free inquiry; it is restricted inquiry even if those
restrictions are covert, or seemingly justified. Free intellectual inquiry so-called has sometimes collapsed
into an undifferentiated relativism or outright cynicism.
And preoccupation with specialization and unconcern
with the compartmentalization of knowledge have sometimes masked implicit absolutisms. In addition, the
more college faculties have been "rescued" from church
control or even looser church relation, the more they
have come to look alike. One begins to wonder if "free
intellectual inquiry" really amounts to the homogenization of inquiry.
Despite the humanizing achievements of the Academy
and its still greater possibilities, the Church insists that
its redemptive effects are, in the final analysis, limited
and ambiguous. Education no more automatically liberates persons and humanizes them than it automatically
provides them with a celebrative delight in life or equips
them for civic responsibility. The presence within the
Academy of pedantry, the compartmentalization of
knowledge, sheer tedium, and the whoring after "technique" are witnesses to the need of the Academy to find
a redemption which it itself cannot provide. Such redemption can come only through the intrusion of a rank
ordering of claims, the interrelation of values, and a
grappling with the meaning and the realization of the
genuinely human. These considerations are specifically
religious.
The need of the Academy to be redeemed is underscored when it is recognized that it too represents a
"principality" (to use Pauline language) which shares
the "fallen" character of the world. If one wants evidence
of this, one need only recall the trend toward collapsing
education into the communication of useful skills, the
scornful elitism which responds to the anti-intellectualism of the culture, the tyranny and Catch-22 character
of accrediting agencies, the increasing influence of
federal power and of large corporate structures, the constant philandering with the methodology of the "hard"
sciences as the only "sure" path of knowledge, the dependence upon bureaucracy and palliatives to deal with
issues like "faculty development." The list goes on and
on. And while it is true that the Church needs redemption as much as the Academy does, the Church points
to the ultimate source of judgment and transformation
for the whole of human life.
Over against the Academy, the Church witnesses to
the ultimate coherence of human knowledge and experience-an implication of monotheism. It demands that
questions of human meaning and self-understanding
have a definite priority (even if, quantitatively, they are
given little conscious attention)- an implication of
Christology. It exposes the "ideological" character of
positivistic notions of knowledge, the dominance of
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technical learning, and the unchallenged assumption
of secularism within the Academy-an implication of
original sin. It argues that the open-ended character of
inquiry and the tentative nature of assertions reflect a
joyful following after a Truth greater than human understanding- an implication of discipleship.
And finally, if the Church is able to discern and respect the religious value of the Academy in its independence from the Church, it must be admitted that
this provides an understanding of the Academy which
the Academy is highly reluctant to make. The fact is,
the properly "secular" and "humanistic" nature of the
Academy all too often falls under the seductive spell of
a secularism and a humanism which implies the absolute autonomy of the Academy. Then it assumes it is
grounded in nothing but itself, that free intellectual
inquiry has only finite moorings, and that the values of
the Academy are substitutes for religious values-not
the expression of them. In such a situation, the Church
affirms the Academy's independence from the Church
but not its avowed independence from God; it confirms
the Academy's integrity by simultaneously arguing for
its transcendent basis.

III
Having come this far, we must now take another step
and ask how, given the independence of the Academy
from the Church, there can be such a thing as a "Christian" college. If its concern and program is shaped by
its participation in the Academy, what remains that can
be deemed "Christian"?
The tempting answer is to identify the "Christian"
character of such institutions with issues concerning the
non-academic features of the college. In other words,
student life policies, activities, interpersonal relationships, and the like are made the provenance of the
Church while the academic life of the college is relegated to the Academy. I believe this is a fundamental
mistake.
The bridge between the terms "free college" and
"Christian" is a theological one. It is not just enough to
include a religion requirement in the curriculum, have
prominent church members sit on the Board of Regents,
sponsor the religious life of the students through a
chapel and a chaplaincy, or create special programs
designed for church members. What is necessary is to
put the aims and program of education into a perspective
informed by the faith and life of the Church. This is a theological perspective that belongs to the Church as a
whole, not just to professional theologians. It belongs
to the Church as it gathers and realizes itself in the
Christian members of the administration, faculty, student body, and constituency. It belongs to the Church
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as it crystallizes something of its life and mission in the
life and program of a college.
As Julian Hartt puts it,
The Christian community is not in its distinctive business until it
has related all the principal features of human life, in all the peculiarities of local formation , to that truth it calls Revelation. So far
then as it is Christian, a university must honor this same obligation.
Indeed a Christian center of higher learning has a quite distinctive
form of this obligation that derives from its more general obligation
to pursue and promulgate the truth by the refinement of the powers
4
of criticism

Christian faith does not provide direct answers to
pedagogical and intellectual issues, but it can provide
a definite perspective for taking up these issues, arranging them in priority, and enabling believing Christians
to evaluate the human suggestions that keep surfacing.
A "Christian college," then, is one which tries to identify
and articulate a perspective on education that is informed by the Gospel. Such a perspective is neither
obvious nor monolithic. It is a matter of continuing debate and revision. But its touchstone is found in its turning again and again to Jesus and his impact on others as
the central clue for understanding human existence.
Such an understanding is consistently relevant to interpreting and evaluating the educational process.
Take as an example the trend toward casting education in terms of occupational training. Placing that
trend in a Christian perspective would include understanding what "Christian vocation" means, recognition
of the religious significance of intellectual life, seeing
the ways in which Christian faith has a stake in issues of
civic responsibility, and facing directly the fact that few
persons grow up with either the ability or inclination
to appreciate "the life of the mind."
Similarly, in asking what is education's role in
prompting civic awareness and involvement, no particular answer can be called "Christian." But because
Christians see life in the light of Jesus the Christ they
have a frame of reference within which to evaluate specific proposals. A concrete example of this can be seen
in the way certain church groups and their colleges promoted the cause of Abolition. Abolition of slavery was
not a uniquely Christian idea, but it was one which demanded to be placed in Christian (that is, theological)
perspective.
At stake is what the Roman Catholic tradition calls
"spiritual formation." This refers to a process of influence which shapes a person's fundamental sensibilities, concerns, aspirations, priorities, self-understanding, and wider sense of what the world is and what it
adds up to. College education is involved in this pro4
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What is at stake is a sense of who we are and what we are up to as academics that is held answerable
to and in fruitful conversation with t he disclosure of human life given in Jesus the Christ.

cess- in the overall design of its program, its course
offerings and shapings, the skills and appreciations it
encourages, the pedagogical techniques it employs, the
relative visibility of social and ethical concerns it addresses, and the like.
A Christian college, I believe, would be one that is
aware of this process of spiritual formation and focuses
on it self-consciously. In addition a Christian college
would be one where a concerted intellectual effort was
made to discern what are the outlines of a Christian
"frame of reference" or "perspective" within which to
place education's content and patterns.
So, for example, if it is argued that a Christian frame
of reference should not subscribe to the viability of
"creationism" in dealing with the origin of the universe
and planetary life, this requires as many theologically
relevant considerations as it does "purely" biological
ones. In addition, it will probably need the assistance
of philosophical analysis in order to sort out certain
assumptions about the nature of knowledge and evidence and hypotheses.
Or, to cite another example, if the viability of the free
market economy is argued for in the economics department, a Christian frame of reference will be sensitive to
the fact that this is not just a "purely" economic judgment. Rather, it is one that entails assumptions about
human nature, the nature of social structures, the dynamics of power, and the like. These are considerations
which are relevant to other disciplines within the Academy and to the theology of the Church.
Or, if courses in Physical Education are included as
requirements in the college curriculum, there is the
opportunity to shape them in light of Christian evaluation of both the life-affirming and the destructive potential in competitive athletics, the psychological ramifications of team sports, and the value of life-long patterns of physical fitness.
A Christian college, therefore , is
1) one that is aware of the reality of "spiritual formation" and how it is relevant to the manifold elements of its life and program, and
2) one where a self-consciously Christian perspective
within which to place issues of spiritual formation
is cared about, articulated, debated, and made a
component feature of the college's life.
This includes such considerations as overall curriculum
design, concrete classroom concerns and goals , and the
shaping of existing and future faculty.
What is at stake is a sense of who we are and what we
are up to as academics that is held answerable to and in
fruitful conversation with the disclosure of human life
given in Jesus the Christ. If a "Christian college" is
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capable of realization, then it must be in the conscious
framework within which is placed the intellectual-valu··
ational-humanistic life of the community in its spiritually formative role. That framework is theological. That
framework is answerable to the Church's understanding
of Christ.
Let me be bold-or foolhardy-enough to venture
what I see as some implications for church-sponsored
education that emerge out of this particular model.
1) We need to debate and make plain a consciously
Christian evaluation of education, of its achievements and possibilities and limits, of its value. The
term "education" comes from the Latin educere
meaning "to lead forth." But we need common
agreement about what it means. Leading forth
from what? Leading forth to what? What is it that
does the leading? How does it lead? And how are
we to know that we are being led forth and not
"backwards" or "in circles"?
2) Consequently, faculty and administration need to
speak openly and spiritedly about the conscious
assumptions and philosophies of education that
motivate the work of each and all. They also need
to recognize and evaluate the still greater number
of unconscious assumptions about education that
bounce around this institution and the larger
Academy, shaping what they are doing in a fundamental way.
3) Hand in hand with this continuing discussion,
there needs to be a theologically informed evaluation of it. Educational assumptions , methods, and
goals need to be reviewed to see where they are
connected with the understanding of life Christians see given in Jesus and his impact on others.
This means that greater theological literacy on the
part of faculty and administrators needs encouragement. Academics who jointly want to create a
free Christian college need to be able to discover
theologically relevant options in their own disciplines, in their style of teaching, in their handling
of students, and in their own scholarship. The selfconsciously Christian academic should be concerned about this whether or not the institution at
which he teaches and works is related to the
Church, or whether it understands itself in theologically Christian terms or not. But a free Christian college should encourage and promote the
process by providing a public forum and public
encouragement.
4) The appointment policies of such colleges need
careful review. The religious significance of the
17
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Academy establishes the priorities of a free Christian college. The commitment of the faculty to the
intellectual life, to the discipline of scholarship,
to the art of teaching, and to the liberal arts as a
form of life (and not just a description of certain
curriculum requirements) is of fundamental importance. Personal piety, specific church affiliation-or lack of it, concern for creating a "caring
community," while relevant and even laudable,
are of lesser importance.
5) Needing equal stress, however, is the need for current and potential faculty and administrators willing to debate and construct a Christian framework
within which to see education, the intellectual life,
and the liberal arts. This requires the strong and
visible presence within the college of persons who
are informed and responsive members of the
Church, whose concern about such a Christian
framework represents a measure of their own personal discipleship. But that is not automatically
equivalent to mere sociological membership in
the Christian community generally or a particular
denomination specifically. Better a non-Lutheran,
for example, who is genuinely concerned to see the
Academy within a theological framework informed
by the Gospel than a merely sociological Lutheran;
better a non-Christian, for example, who is willing
to consider a religious framework for the life of the
Academy and who will debate a specifically Christian framework than a theologically indifferent
Christian; better an agnostic free from secular
humanism's hostility to religion who is socratically
probing and reflective about a religious interpretation of the Academy than someone who is only
nominally "religious." The realization of a free
Christian college requires the conscious and responsible building up of a community of scholars
who are interested in and capable of articulating a
Christian perspective on the Academy and their
place within it. Non-Christian academics who can
in good conscience enter into such conversation
and do so with competence and enthusiasm assist
in this task .
6) Colleges that aim at consciously being free Christian colleges need not be apologetic about it. The
fact of the matter is that pluralism is a creative and
ameliorating element in American society (and
world community for that matter). Contrary to
what some educators believe, higher education did
not create this pluralism; it capitalized upon it.
That pluralism lies in the religious, cultural, ethnic, and regional diversity of peoples and groups;
it is a pluralism that underlies the emergence of
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church-related colleges. At a time when institutions of higher education are consciously trying to
differentiate themselves from one another, it
would be ironic in the highest degree if colleges
ignored the heterogeneity implicit in their origins.
Education, the intellectual life, and the liberal arts
flourish not by homogenization and generalization, not by compartmentalization and detachment.
They are stimulated, rather, by the lively interchange of concrete points of view; they call for
engagement, even if it is self-qualifying and openended. A Christian college that is free- appreciative of academic freedom and free from narrow
parochialism-contributes to such an interchange.
7) A free Christian college can be a source of enrichment and prophetic criticism for the life of the
Church. It has this potential role since it stands
within both Academy and Church. It can point
out to the Church the religious value of the
Academy and the ways in which it rightly corrects
the Church. It can remind the Church of the religious value of education and the intellectual life
and thereby resist the anti-intellectualism that constantly seeks to mask itself as piety, dominate the
life of the Church, and make it a victim of irrationality, fanaticism, and hatred of the Truth. By
bringing the Academy into the Church, a free
Christian college can help the Church discern and
combat its own absolutism, its cultural captivity,
its parochialism and loss of its moral fibre.
8) A free Christian college consciously fosters in its
student body an awareness of its own education
from the standpoint of "Christian vocation." It
encourages understanding potential employment
from the standpoint of service. It outlines the scope
of contemporary civic awareness and responsibility. It distinguishes concern for the substance of
education (expanded appreciation, critical
thought, etc.) from concern with the form of education (requirements, diploma, etc.). It values intellectual reflection and life-long learning. In
short, it helps students see the religious significance of the Academy. This is most effective! y done
by faculty and administrators who are able to understand their own participation in the Academy
from this very standpoint of "Christian vocation."
9) Academics and administrators who want to build a
free Christian college should seek to embody in
their own professional lives the values the Church
sees in the Academy. They should try to reflect the
liberating character of learning. They should be
conscious of the ways learning impinges on citizenship. They should select pedagogical skills and
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The model of a free Christian college outlines a concrete possibility for church-related colleges '
reflection about intentional identity and t he concrete life and program that can be built on it.

aims that encourage maximizing the responsible
freedom of students. They should find room for a
diversity of avocational activities and interests.
They should want to interrelate and integrate the
wide scope of intellectual inquiry and human activity without neglecting their own discipline. On
the contrary, they should see how their own discipline can inform and assist others.
IV
As we have seen, the life of the Church and that of the
Academy have intersected from the very early years of
Christian history. At some times they have conflicted
with each other, at others they have converged; at some
times they have gone their separate ways, at others they
have been sources of mutual stimulation. But the question of how they ought to be related to each other surfaces when one takes up the question of the intentional
identity of church-related colleges.
The Danforth Report calls attention to the model of
the "free Christian college." But at issue is what that
notion means and how it prescribes the intersection between Academy and Church. In order to stimulate and
further that task, I have presented a dialectical evaluation of the Academy from a Christian perspective, one
that finds religious significance and independence for
the Academy apart from the Church but which, at the
same time, insists that the Academy's autonomy is not
absolute or unqualified in the light of what the Church
sees in Jesus. The heart of this qualified evaluation is a
Christian appreciation of the free character of the
Academy.
I have pushed the argument even further by taking
up the question of how a college can in any sense be
"Christian" and not merely church-related. Such a question reflects concern for conscious purpose, not simply
historical accident; it looks for motivation generated by
vision, not the momentum of unchecked inertia. I have
argued first that a college is "Christian" when it attempts
to place its academic program and goals in theological
perspective. Second, I have asserted that a Christian
college is aware of how its program and goals effect
spiritual formation and reviews that spiritual formation
in the light of the Gospel.
I believe this model of a free Christian college outlines a concrete possibility for church-related colleges'
reflection about their intentional identity and the concrete life and program that can be built on it. Such a
model, and the conscious shaping effect it can have on
their future, is warranted by the current states of both
the Academy and the situation of higher education in
the United States. The Academy can only stand to gain
by dealing with greater measures of intellectual pluralDecember, 1983

ism; it needs the contributions of self-conscious perspectives including those of free Christian colleges.
In addition, the present state of American higher education promises to promote colleges that can demonstrate distinguishable identities. As in the case of the
Academy, pluralism seems to be the direction in which
to move. Once again, such specificity and pluralism are
served by free Christian colleges.
Moreover, both Church and society need a clear alternative to the fundamentalist model for what is billed
as "Christian education." If there is no alternative to a
"defender of the faith" college, or a "non-affirming"
college, or merely "church-related" college, Christian
people and Americans at large will identify a consciously Christian perspective on higher education with parochialism, suspicion of the Academy, and ecclesiastical
imperialism.
What is sad and frightening to recognize is that
church-related colleges are free to respond to these
challenges by ignoring the question of intentional identity. They can merely coast on their sociologically defined identities. They can take refuge in primary identities that are ethnocentric, regional, and denominational. Yet the model of a free Christian college is a
viable possibility. The question that is left to haunt us is
not the formal one which asks whether or not such a
model exists, rather it is the material one which asks
whether or not the concern and will to implement it can
Cl
be found.

Hail Mary
With all the chutzpah
of a fly lighting on the swatter,
God assumed a human body.
He knew what he was getting intodust recycled on its way to dusthe knew that loads across
the shoulders make a body weary,
that skin is torn by thorns
and flesh is pierced by spears.
And yet, on the wheel of eternity,
the potter entered the clay.
That was hard, very hard,
even for an angel to explain to Mary
that extraterrestrial day
in dusty Nazareth.

Bernhard Hillila
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Cam Diary

A Russian
Christmas Meditation
Richard Lee
The perversity of my editor's
deadlines means I must write a
Christmas column to him in Indiana
in October while I happen to be
traveling in Russia nearer to the
anniversary of the Communist Revolution. He may think such a dislocation frees the mind for a fresh
thought, but about all I can see in
common to the nearing celebration
of the Revolution here and Christmas there is that the weather for me
in Russia in October is nearly what
it will be like for him in Indiana in
December.
And yet my editor has been known
to be right. His unseasonable deadline does stir a thought which I at
least might not have considered
were I not in Russia compelled to
think proleptically about Christmas.
That thought concerns the poor and
all for whom Christmas means being
"filled with good things" while "the
rich are sent empty away." Those
words from the Blessed Virgin's
Song of the Incarnation especially
occur to me today in a country about
to celebrate the most colossally
failed revolution in history.
One is not here long before it is
apparent that the two great "Re-

Richard Lee is on sabbatical leave m
Cambridge from Christ College m
Valparaiso University.

20

deemer Nations" of the world contest each other in their service of the
same god. Productivity. The contest, of course, is complicated almost
beyond the human capacity to cope
by their counterproductivity of
apocalyptic weapons which could
end the contest-and the contestants
-catastrophically. Meanwhile, the
helpless bystanders of this agony are
the poor of the world below vastly
wealthy America and just beneath
tolerably well off Russia.
It is, I think, difficult for Christians to keep a faithful perspective
when Christmas calls them more to
a concern for the poor than to any
concern they may have for the "long,
twilight struggle" between Russia
and America. The Christian faith is
obviously not an economic program
much less an economic system, but
it is fully centered upon the poor.
At Christmas we recall our faith is
saving faith in Him "who was rich
yet became poor so that by his poverty we might become rich." No less
do we remember our faith is serving
faith for the poor whom He blesses
with the Kingdom of God.
It seems to me such faith serves
first in the economic realm by cleansing us of our sentiments concerning
the poor. They are not the deserving poor of Victorian uplift. Not the
virtuous poor of Tolstoyan mysticism. Not the messianic poor of
creaking Marxist orthodoxy. Not
the politically volatile poor of welfare state handouts. Perhaps not
even the poor "in spirit" of Matthew's bourgeois gloss of Luke. Faith
keeps the focus on the poor who, in
words of one syllable, do not have
what they need to live at all or live
at all well. It is these poor our Lord
assured us would always be with us"and whenever you will you can do
good to them ." These poor may
know nothing about themselves except their need for just about everything beside our sentiments. Secondly, it seems to me that once faith
sufficiently astringes our sentiments
it may lay hold of our Lord's mystery
concerning the poor. He who came
to "preach good news to the poor"
consummated that coming by con-

secrating them with His real presence. Indeed, the depth of the mystery is that our Lord Himself hungers and thirsts in the poor- and
inasmuch as the least of them are
relieved we do it unto Him. For
faith His assurance that "you will
always have the poor with you"
equals His assurance "lo, I am with
you always even to the end of the
age."
In His consecration of the poor
they take on no virtue in themselves
and remain fully themselves. But
they become for faith one of the
"outward and visible signs" of His
real presence, and in-with-and-under their relief He offers the "inward and spiritual grace" of the
Kingdom of God. The rich may be
disabused of their morality moved
by sentiment and restored to His
life generously moved by His mystery. And the poor may receive the
means of this life which makes any
hunger and thirst for His life to
come genuinely unsentimental.
Our Lord's mystery concerning
the poor is, of course, a stumbling
block if not utter folly to capitalist
and communist alike. The mysteries
of God are never human projects
nor are they easy to live with for
anybody. His real presence with the
poor has no programmatic relevance
to any economic system at the same
time it is of utmost relevance to the

faithfu l who must make their own
judgments about the economic systems in which they stand as well as
their personal wealth in those systems. Stewards of the mysteries of
God must, by definition, be stewards
of the poor.
Travel , as they say, is very narrowing. Under duress of deadline
for a Christmas column in October
while uprooted in Russia one thinks
homeward to that other, greater
"Redeemer Nation" where freedom
remains for the faithful to ask what
its economic system does first for the
poor, then for the rich, and how rich
and poor can meet to receive one of
the mysteries of the Incarnation.
Any day that asking happens is at
least Advent, and Christmas could
be coming.

••••
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Television

Vietnam II?
Is Central America a
Replay of an Old Script?
James Combs
It is one of the disciplines of the
student of mass media not to accept
on its face what so many people, in
and out of the industry, seem to accept as chiseled-in-stone truth. Journalistic and political rhetoric
abounds in phrases mouthed without much reflection: "a free press,"
the "adversary relationship" of press
and politicians, "media bias," "manipulation of the press," and so on.
Such terms are just rhetoric, and
serve functions for people by being
emptied of meaning. It is too uncomfortable to give up our illusions,
so the myths remain to comfort us
that what we want to believe is true.
The media is biased against those
we like; the press really is free; the
adversary relationship works.
The difficulty is that such myths
are rudimentary theories we cherish, and like ~II our beautiful theories, are often darkly murdered by
gangs of brutal facts. In what sense
is the American press free, since it is
largely owned by a small number of
very wealthy people? Is it true that
the press is free only if you own one?
How do you have an adversary relationship, when as in the Cuban missile crisis, the press cooperated with
the government by withholding
news, faithfully accepting the
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The relationship between the mass media and American
political life is obscured by myth and illusion.
government's version of what caused
the showdown, and hailing the resolution as a great patriotic victory?
If, as every group claims, the
media are biased· negatively against
us and positively for our enemies,
how do they manage to do that? If
the national media are so manipulated by successive recent Administrations, why do political leaders
and spokespersons in those governments bitterly attack the media, express frustration over their independence and their penchant for
reporting things the people in power
don't like to have told, and give
them belated blame (or credit) for
bringing them down in the end?
But is it not also now the case that
the national press is being accused of
being "soft on Reagan," relatively
uncritical, serving up creampuff
questions at press conferences, acting even as Administration shills,
and submissively acquiescing in
Presidential pseudo-events (such as
Nancy bringing out Ron's birthday
cake at the conclusion of a televised
press conference)? The charges and
defenses of mass-mediated news, and
even the evidence, are so conflicting
that anyone who tries to make sense
out of the role of the mass media in
American society is reduced to asking that age-old question, What,
after all, is truth?
The truth, to evade answering, is
that nobody is quite sure just what is
true about this question. In politics,
of course, what is argued about the
news media depends on your point
of view; but the argument rages
among scholars too, with quite honorable (and some dishonorable) people on all sides of such questions.
But one thing is certain: politicians,
scholars, and mass mediators are
convinced of the media's importance
in shaping opinions, political acts,
and the outcome of historical events.
If some, indeed nearly all, American politicians lash out at the news
media when under heat, they are
simply acting out a verbal equiva-

lent of those indicted mobsters who
eme1 ge from courthouses under
siege by the cameras and take a
swing at the cameramen, or, more
amusing, try to cover the camera
lens as if to shut out the world they
know is watching them. No doubt
most politicos have in moments of
frustration wished they could shut
the world out so summarily.
President Reagan is a current case
in point. Here's a man who is long
used to the camera, does well in controlled settings before it (has any
President ever gotten on and off
helicopters on the White House lawn
with such finesse?), professes to like
reporters and respect their profession (we're all in show biz), and generally thinks (with some reason, his
opponents might grumble in reply)
that the press treats him fairly. But
once in a while, this happy symbiotic
clear sky is clouded by a discouraging word, first from one side and
then from the other. The national
press corps complains about lack of
access to the President, favoritism
for friendly reporters, and having
to hang around during long Presidential vacations.
But recently Reagan has revived
an ancient Presidential complaint,
one curiously out of character for
him. In a speech before a friendly
audience, the Veterans of Foreign
Wars, he condemned press "discouraging hype and hoopla" over
his policies toward Central America
and argued that the major news organizations were giving the nation a
distorted view of what was happening there. Presidential sensitivity to
the charge that he doesn't know what
is happening there, or what we're
doing there, cropped up in his radio
pronouncement the week before
that "the great majority of Americans don't know which side we are
on" (or probably care, he didn't dare
add).
In the VFW speech, he did give
the national press an out by saying
they too are so misled that journal21

Reagan 's frustration with the press is a common Presidential malady which can be
expected to be cured if things go our way in Central America-but not if they don't.
ists in some cases were "reporting
the disinformation and demagoguery they hear coming from people
who put politics ahead of our national interest." Presumably these rabblerousers are the political critics
of his Central America policy, chiefly Democratic Presidential contenders who can smell the potential for a
good campaign issue next year. But
the specific question was left open
again: which demagogic politicians
are leading the news media around
by the nose and cynically feeding
us "disinformation"?
Media spokesmen were quick to
deny their complicity with these
unnamed demagogues who were
conspiring to undermine "the national interest." But the media response was predictable too, almost
with a bemused haven't-we-livedthrough-this-before air: the Reagan
Administration, they maintained,
was setting the agenda in Central
America, including the visible military intervention; they couldn't see
the progress on human rights and
economic development the Administration did; and they were not part
of any anti-Reagan cabal nor beholden to any prejudged viewpoint.
Looking across the range of TV,
news magazines, and newspaper reports from Central America, I find
myself a great deal of confusion
about what is happening , what
should happen , what can be done
to make what we want happen, and
most of all , what we down deep inside don't want to happen. So what
is truth, and who are the disinformers?
Reagan's frustration with the
press is a common Presidential
malady which can be expected to be
cured if things go our way in Central America. If they don't, then the
disease is likely to get worse and
poison the amiable relationship he
has largely enjoyed to date. For if
things go badly in a major foreign
policy commitment-as Central
America by now certainly is-then
22

Presidents and their minions are
tempted to play kill-the-messenger,
and then, by golly, you really do
have an adversary relationship.
"Distortions" occur when the media
are bringing back the bad news.
Now Mr. Reagan, probably more
so than most Presidents, likes to accentuate the positive-the economy
is getting better, the safety net has
no holes in it, America is "respected"
in the world again, and so forth. It
is at least an irritant, and sometimes
a major threat, if major media organizations question that. No President likes to see his view of reality
contradicted.

If you read and watch
the gamut of perspectives
on Central America , you
wind up not knowing
just what the hell
you ought to believe.
The problem has been compounded for recent Presidents for a
wide variety of reasons. The most
important of these, I believe, is that
they have inherited a legacy of lies
from former Presidents. Reagan
seems sincere and well-meaning (as
did Ford and Carter too), but when
Presidents try to explain what we
need to do people either ignore
them or don't believe them. So when
frustration sets in over people's lack
of enthusiasm for some great new
political enterprise, journalists get
tagged as the villains, the distorters
of democratic communion between
leader and led. The bald fact is that
the led trust the media more than
leaders, or to put it another way,
they believe politicians lie more
than TV newscasters.
For another reason, the media
have proliferated to the point that
we have access to a wide and conflicting variety of viewpoints and
explanations. If you read and watch
the gamut of perspectives on Central
America, you wind up not knowing
what the hell to believe. There is

probably less of a media-wide shared
definition of the situation (sometimes called "pack journalism") than
obtained in, say, the Korean War or
the Cuban missile crisis. The mass
media now are more pluralistic, less
deferential, and perhaps even less
"patriotic" (in the worst sense of that
word) than before.
Even Reagan's celebrated charm
can't disarm most of the White
House press corps at press conferences, and Sam Donaldson just won't
shut up. Journalists will not take
official reality on face from the
White House, the State Department,
or the Pentagon; they are-like
many, perhaps most, of their fellow
Americans-skeptical of what the
government tells them. They usually
assume the government is lying,
and they look for the hidden agenda
or truth behind the lies.
Official briefings and statements
about what we are doing in Central
America are followed by media discoveries that the briefings and statements convey less than the truth.
After Pentagon and White House
assurances that U .S. Army "advisors"
in El Salvador were not carrying
arms or going into combat, lo and
behold, CNN News quickly found a
thoroughly armed American heading into the jungle. Reporters interview the guerillas there, doubt seriously the reported improvement
in human rights violations, and regularly discredit Administration
claims about the progress of the war.
They have made the "covert" war
to overthrow the Sandinistas in Nicaragua rather overt, have pointed
out the brutalities of the right-wing
governments of the region (they
have reported leftist atrocities and
suppressions as well) , and in general
have communicated skepticism, even
cynicism, about whether the Reagan
Administration knows what it's
doing in the area.
There is, as everyone knows, another reason why relations between
Presidents and press have changed :
The Cresset

TV news may or may not be hostile to the idea of a big American commitment to
Central America , but it doesn't matter: all it has to do is report it, just show it.
Vietnam. Reagan, ever the Great
Communicator, constantly conjures
it up by insisting that Central America will never become another Vietnam, vowing never to commit American troops, and insisting that any
analogy between the two situations
is spurious. But with the legacy of
Vietnam, both public and press
have a tough time believing him. In
a sense, that is not his fault, but complaining about it will not ch.ange it.
Any military move, or even threat,
reminds people of past Presidents
who sent "advisors" to Vietnam, who
sought no wider war, who pointed
to the domino theory, who saw Communists swarming ashore at San
Diego, who justified the sacrifice in
blood and treasure because of our
"vital interests," who were increasingly disbelieved, and who blamed
-and harassed and intimidatedthe media for the disbelief.
The important American mass
media, TV news most prominently,
are not neutral in reporting, but
they are not necessarily hostile. The
"distortions" they report are mediations of confusions among both politicians and public; or, to put it another way, they reflect, and accentuate thereby, the extent to which an
Administration is not doing well,
not communicating well, not being
believed. Vietnam was the precedent
of a "living room war," a monumental confusion that was mediated
by television into our homes in
frightful color. War would never be
the same; indeed, many observers
think it impossible for America ever
to commit itself to another Vietnam
or to anything close to it.
TV news may or may not be hostile to the idea of a big American
commitment to Central America,
but it doesn't matter: all it has to do
is report it, just show it. Terrible
memories return with the shots of
Americans disembarking from helicopters, of villages being burned, of
napalm and jungle trails and executed villagers, of terrorist bombDecember, 1983

ings of American personnel, of corrupt and reactionary local governments, of hungry and dispossessed
peasants, and, most of all, of American casualties. Any American President who would commit the nation
to another such venture would, in
my estimation, be commiting political suicide. Perhaps that is a bad
thing, but politicians should not
treat the skepticism of press and
public lightly. Perhaps dirty little
wars are only possible nowadays
when people can't see them. How
much does the Soviet public see of
Afghanistan?
Someone has remarked that Ronald Reagan seems to want to re-stage
most of the twentieth century- the
Coolidge Prosperity, the Great Depression and New Deal, World War
II, the Cold War, the Eisenhower
Normalcy, even the Sixties, which
created Reagan politically. Some of
that is worth restaging, but even as
TV images of unemployment, bread
lines, and dead factories are all too
reminiscent of the Depression, the
TV images of Central America are
all too reminiscent of Vietnam. Historical analogies may be misleading,
but they are irresistible, and both
press and public react to what politi-

cians do in the present by references
to the past.
There are not many Americans
around any more who can relate the
plight of the unemployed and dispossessed to memories of the Depression. This tends, at least to some
extent, to defuse economics as an
issue. But Central America remains
potentially explosive, since Vietnam
is so recent and its memories so
traumatic. Members of the news
media were part of the Vietnam experience, and they were as affected
by it as most Americans. "Vietnam
Vietnam Vietnam," concluded
Michael Herr in his book on media
coverage of Nam, "we've all been
there." If TV journalists are trying
to keep us out of war in Central
America, it's because th ey, like many
Americans, have been there; they
learned from it the bitter lesson that
people in power can create insanities. Whether the people in power
now, or in subsequent Administrations, have learned what newspeople learned remains to be seen. We
shall soon see whether the skepticism, and even hostility, of TV news
over the Central-American adventure is well founded, and whether
we are going there again.
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What's a
Director to Do?

A Shapeless Production
Of Marlowe's Tamburlaine
John Steven Paul
The American Players Theatre,
nestled atop a heavily forested hill
in the Frank Lloyd Wright country
near Spring Green, Wisconsin, has
cast Nature herself in a stunningly
dra m atic role. The rough-hewn
shafts that tower above the unroofed
stage of this three-year-old theatrical
enterprise are strangely reminiscent
of the eerie forms of Stonehenge.
And , like Stonehenge, you don't
simply drive up to the place. After a
forty-five minute drive from Madison (and, despite information in the
publicity, Spring Green's a fourhour drive from Chicago) you park
somewhere below the theatre and
take a deceptively short trek to the
ticket booth. H er e, of course, you
pay your money, and are only then
pointed in the direction of a little
breach in the thicket, marked by a
pair of johnny-on-the-spot portable
toilets. Ascending the winding, dusty
trail through opulent flora and occasional fauna you may wish to stop
for a momentary breather on the

John Steven Paul teaches in the Department of Speech and Drama at Valparaiso University and writes regularly
on Theatre for The Cresset.
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The American Players Theatre dreams of creating
a classical theatre in the heart of the country.
wooden benches placed every few
hundred yards-unless, for some inexplicable reason, you arrive at box
office level just before curtain.
In return for your climb you get a
gorgeous view from the crest of the
hill, encompassing the timbered
stage, the amphitheatre and support
buildings, the lush green forests,
and about a dozen-and-a-half portable johnnys (fourteen labeled
"women" and four "men"). This is
the remarkable American Players
Theatre, remotely but magnificently
situated in a place that, but for bloodthirsty mosquitoes, grinding cicadae, and a clamorous breeze rushing
through the leaves of all those trees,
is perfect for classics of Western
drama.
The APT installation is the
dream-coming-true of Korean-born
Randall Duk Kim and two associates. Kim, a veteran of more than
twenty years on the stage including
a performance as Hamlet for the
Guthrie Theatre in Minneapolis,
serves as the company's artistic director and principal actor. He is a
very fine talent. In 1977, according
to the souvenir program, Kim and
four others conceived the idea of an
American classical theatre. Then
located in Washington, D .C. , the
group presented its first production ,
a one-man show about Walt Whitman starring Kim, to mixed reviews.
After some more cogitation, the
group decided it wished to be "closer
to nature, in an area where goods
and services were less expensive,
and where a company could better
know and interact with its neighbors."
WISCONSIN! Two of the group
resigned. Kim and the two others
searched Wisconsin for a congenial
location-and a base of supportand settled on and in Spring Green,
up the hill from the Wisconsin River
and down the road from the Frank
Lloyd Wright Restaurant. While the
group is "only at the beginning of
this herculean labor," which they

hope wi·ll eventually result in a "national theatre" touring from a home
base in "America's heartland," it is
an impressive beginning. The APT
now looks back on four summers of
activity, a nine-play repertoire, sustained volunteer support, and a long
list of institutional, corporate, and
individual donors.
The glossy program book, which
costs four dollars, binds together the
usual lists of casts and crews and
contributors, commentary on the
plays in repertory , and insights into
artistic decisions. There is also a
good deal of high-flown philosophy,
some of which is quite revealing,
especially when read by stage light.
We seek, writes the artistic director,
to realize a theatre th at serves a huma niz ing a nd integrating function in th e growth
a nd well-being of th e American community . ... We long for a classical th eatre th at
can draw th e members of the community
together to share and celebrate a moment
of common hum anity as th e living mortally
encounters th e dead throu gh dramatic embodiments o f a ncestr a l me mo ri es a nd
drea ms. .
With th e revolutionary advance of mass co mmunication and high
technology in our time, the classical stage,
with its inherent mortality, its life dimensions and its hum a n proportions beco mes
increas ingly an invalu able a nd necessary
means of vital contact a nd perso nal dialogue for which th ere can be no substitute .. . . We have come to the middle of the
country to wage our battle for thi s th eatre;
in becoming a part of this fa mily community. still so close to nature a nd elemental
forces. we have th e rare opportun ity to
make immedi ate and u ndreamt-of co nnections not only with cl assical world d rama
bu t with huma n life as manifested in earlier times.

The APT philosophy draws its
own bravos and benisons from all of
us middle-border types-especially
those who toil in university theatres.
Its ultra-slick packaging and superreverent phraseology notwithstanding, we can hardly afford to be cynical in the face of such idealism, for,
in essence, it constitutes the theatre's
only real chance in an uncongenial
social setting. The philosopher goes
on to speak about how the plays will
look on stage: "We have a passion
The Cresset

If we take the APT at its word , it is attempting to restore an approach to
theatrical production with which Shakespeare himself might have been comfortable.
to know all the plays scheduled for
production in the years ahead, intimately, on their own terms, complete and uncut. With conscientious
study and diligent practice, we are
determined to be guided and taught by
the texts themselves . ... "
This last pledge of unflinching
dedication to the text is entirely in
harmony with the foregoing statements of purpose and principle.
The classics are the classics because
of the timeless significance of their
plots, characters, themes , music,
spectacle, and language. The text is
the vessel of that significance, and,
thus, the text should be studied and
revealed upon the stage. When audiences come to the theatre to see and
hear the play they expect to get what
the dramatist has written and thus
what has come to the rest of us in the
text. On a first reading, Randall Duk
Kim's reification of the text as a
guide and a teacher seems only an
enthusiastic conceit. But another
segment of the program, "On Directing," indicates just how literally the
APT understands the philosophy of
text as guide and teacher.
... a t American Pl ayers Th eatre the play
itself is considered the primary director,
with three colla borating directors serving
as guides to the text and making th e arti stic
decisio ns essential in tra nsferring a play
from the page to the stage .... Making the
a rtistic decisions, however. does not mean
that the collaborating directors do minate
th e a rtistic input. for in reality the direction
is a collaboration of more th a n thirty people, including th e entire acting compa ny,
th e costume and lighting desig ners, mu sic
composer, a nd eve n to a degree th e technicia ns.

The APT cultivates all this collaboration in order to avoid "limiting the production to a single artistic
vision." And, perhaps, its notion of
a multiple or collaborative artistic
vision is consonant with its larger
goals with regard to productions of
the classics. What we call "the classics" were all written in a time before the theatre had any place for
"single artistic visions," or directors
December, 1983

for that matter. In Shakespeare's
London, the playwright may have
served as a guide for the actors in his
play; he may even have arranged
the players on the stage. Costumes,
properties, and stage business were
worked out by the actors according
to prevailing conventions. Actors
were famed for their personal rhetorical styles and skills.
Whatever unity there may have
been was the result of what we would
now term the ensemble; that is, a
group of players had worked and
become familiar with one another's
work over the course of time. On the
great perspective scene stages of the
Italian and French Baroque, painters and stage architects worked
quite independently of actors and
stage managers. Actors and plays
were of relatively minor importance
in the spectacular theatre of scenic
artists such as the Bibienas, Torelli,
Piranesi, Inigo Jones.
Independent collaboration in the
theatre gave way to the director in
the late nineteenth century when
two aesthetic impulses established
themselves. The first was antiquarianism, a natural child of an age
obsessed with history and historicism. Producers such as Charles
Kemble, Henry Irving, and the
Duke of Saxe-Meiningen tried to
make the "old plays" correspond to
what historians and archeologists
had discovered about the periods
in which the plays were set. Settings,
properties, and costumes for Julius
Caesar ought to look like those of
first century Rome, for example;
Macbeth ought to look like medieval
Scotland. Coordinating and unifying these elaborate antiquarian efforts required a new position in the
theatre: the regisseur or director.
The other innovation in theatre
aesthetics in the late nineteenth century was "total theatre," or what
Richard Wagner named gesamtkunstwerk. A single, magnificent concept in the mind of a Wagner, or
Max Reinhart, or Edward Gordon

Craig, or David Belasco was to be
incarnated upon the stage, with
every resource of the theatre, including actors, proceeding from and
supporting the central concept. This
approach to theatrical production
is largely what has come down to us
today in what the American Players
Theatre program calls "conventional
productions." Such an approach
may call to mind egomaniacal directors pompously ordering other arists around the theatre. But it also
must immediately be said that while
there had been dramatic poetry for
centuries, it was only after the advent of unified theatrical production
that there could be poetry in the
theatre. In the best sense, the director is a poet or maker of theatre art.
If we take the APT at its word, as
set down in the program, it is attempting to restore an approach to
theatrical production with which
William Shakespeare himself might
have been comfortable: an approach
where everyone contributes to the
production according to what the
text has taught him . Of course, the
playwright isn't around to answer
questions, so, according to the program, research is the key to the effectiveness of this method. Everyone
does his own research. There are
usually three or four people listed
as "directors" who serve as guidesrather like research librarians.
The proof of this method is in the
putting of a play on the stage. The
newest play in the company's repertoire is a jim-dandy test case: Tamburlaine The Great, Part I written by
Christopher Marlowe and first performed before an Elizabethan audience in 1586. Don't feel too bad if
you're not as familiar with Tamburlaine as with some of Marlowe's
more famous works such as The few
Of Malta, Edward II, and The Massacre
at Paris. His last play, Dr. Faustus, is
most familiar in a movie version
starring Richard Burton and Elizabeth Taylor. Marlowe was the dramatist who introduced blank-verse
25

What are we to make of such a butcher as Tamburlaine? A reading of the text suggests
that Marlowe was fascinated by the very ruthlessness and determination of the man.
dramatic poetry to the Elizabethan
public theatres, and most scholars
feel that he would have been greater
than Shakespeare had his life not
been cut short in a tavern fight.
There is a persistent if minority
opinion that Marlowe did not die
in a tavern fight but slipped out of
England to Italy as a political persona non grata where he continued
to write plays, smuggling them
north to theatre managers under the
improbable pseudonym of "Will
Shakespeare," then an actor in London.
In this his first play, Marlowe relates the history of the fourteenthcentury Mongolian conqueror Timur Khan, or Tamburlaine, whose
aspirations took him from life as a
shepherd in Scythia to King of Persia and tyrant of much of Asia. The
action of the play is fairly simple.
Tamburlaine and some compatriots
battle and overthrow the King of
Persia and his army; then they battle and overthrow the Emperor of
Turkey and his army; then they battle and overthrow the sultan of
Egypt and his army.
Along the way there is a great deal
of gratuitous violence graphically
portrayed in blank verse. For example, after he bests the Turkish emperor Bajazeth, Tamburlaine imprisons him in a wheeled cage and
drags the conquered one in shame
behind his entourage. The Empress
is made a slave of Tamburlaine's
own concubine. The formerly royal
couple is so depressed by this turn
of fortune that they bash their brains
out on the bars of the Emperor's
cage. Later, with Tamburlaine and
his men standing outside the walls
of Damascus, the Egyptians' last
stronghold, the Governor of Damascus sends out several virgins to
plead for mercy. Tamburlaine orders the virgins slaughtered and
their carcasses hung up on the city's
walls.
What are we to make of such a
butcher? A reading of the text sug-
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gests that Marlowe was fascinated
by the very ruthlessness and determination of Tamburlaine. He is
neither the chivalrous Knight of the
romances nor is he the type of Machiavellian lion/fox that was to be such
a compelling figure for Shakespeare.
While still a shepherd Tamburlaine
divulges his two primary motives.
He "means to be a terror to the
world" and create an empire "measured only by east and west." In his
bed he wants Zenocrate, the Sultan
of Egypt's daughter and everyone's
ideal of pulchritude. In other words,
he wants to turn the world upside
down. In so doing he lays waste not
only to every person in his path, but
to every ideal and value that the
Tudor culture held dear: order and
degree, moderation, divine right of
kingship, and so forth.

For Shakespeare, the
rebel was always a source
of cosmic disruption.
For Shakespeare, the rebel was always a source of cosmic disruption
and calamity, and certainly not one
to be promoted. In the play Tamburlaine the Great, Marlowe celebrates
the rebel and not, it should be
added, the romantic revolutionary
fighting against social or moral injustice. Marlowe's brutal, pitiless
rebel conquers the world for himself. This is, of course, one person's
reading of the text.
In the American Players Theatre
program, Mik Derks offers another
reading of the text. In a "conventional production," Derks might be
assumed to be the director of Tamburlaine the Great. Here he is listed
first among four collaborating directors and also as author of the program notes. Derks points out that
Tamburlaine was a historical figure
well known to the Elizabethans, one
ardently hated for his ruthless conquests and savage atrocities. And
yet, Marlowe manages to make him
the hero of his play without altering

any of the historical facts. If the
Elizabethans who watched Edward
Alleyn enact the role some two hundred years after the tyrant's death
were indeed well-acquainted with
the historical Tamburlaine, they
were much more fortunate than
their modern American counterparts in Spring Green. Most of us
simply had no frame of reference for
this Asian brute. (I worried for the
members of the audience who hadn't
forked over the four dollars for the
program.) Despite our lack of knowledge of the historical Tamburlaine,
it was near impossible to regard him
as a hero.
The modern audience's historical
disadvantage redoubles the production director's responsibility for
creating that frame of reference on
stage. But, of course, Tamburlaine
had no director, other than the text.
But what exactly is the text? The
record of a message sent by playwright to his audience which shared
with him a generally common understanding of the world and its inhabitants. In the conventional production the director's function begins with a reading of the textwhich, unable to speak for itself,
must first be read. Having read his
message, the director replaces the
absent playwright as the sender of
that message to his audience, with
whom he shares understandings in
common.
The director's art, based on his
reading, is one of composition, of
arranging elements on his stage canvas. The director focuses the audience's attention on the essential elements of the drama by emphasizing
stage positions. It is an actor's responsibility to read the text for
meaning and then clarify that meaning through the use of accents,
pauses, and stresses, but the director
listens, judges, and corrects the actor's work. The director assumes the
double role of poet and audience.
The director makes the art and then
looks at it with the eye, ear, and
The Cresset

The show is more pageant
than anything else.
mind of his audience. It is a terrible
responsibility, fraught with potential for error and misjudgment, not
one to be taken lightly.
On stage, Tamburlaine the Great
was more a pageant than anything
else. Troupe after troupe of brightlycostumed actors marched across the
stage spouting martial verse in iambic pentameter, occasionally engaging each other in slow-motion
battle pantomimes. One wondered
how these warriors steeped in dusty,
bloody combat could continue to
look so fresh and newly garbed; it
was as if Tamburlaine fought his
wars on the way home from the
haberdasher. This costumer's party
is difficult if not impossible to sort
out. Randall Duk Kim creates an
interesting and sometimes compelling Tamburlaine. Kim is a small
man and the irony of his victories
over much larger men was not lost.
His oriental features gave the character an appropriately exotic quality. And the APT's artistic director
has a way with Marlowe's mighty
line. The rest of the large cast of
dramatis personae stirred themselves into a colorful stew. Hardly
anyone was distinguishable as actor
or character, and nearly everyone
had a difficult time making the poetic magic that the program notes
promised.
Without benefit of a director's
shaping, the audience was left to
make what it would of Tamburlaine.
Had the production been less fancily
dressed and the delivery of the lines
less rhetorical, had the whole thing,
in short, been more comprehensible,
the audience might have shuddered
at the celebration of this idiosyncratic, monomaniacal tyrant. Conscious of some well known twentiethcentury brutes, the audience might
have wondered why the American
Players Theatre, which is committed
to humanizing, integrating, and promoting the well being of the American community, has added this play
to its repertoire.
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The Hazards
Of Competitions

Keith Paulson-Thorp
Contemporary music seldom attracts more than a handful of talented performers. Those who enjoy
its particular challenges and rewards, however, are not always able
to find pieces that will satisfy their
curiosities. What few pieces actually
appear in published form will usually be out-of-print by the time most
of us are aware of their presence.
From the composer's point of view,
it is difficult to achieve the recognition which would insure that these
performers will have access to one's
music, and thus be able to present
to the public reasonable interpretations of our work.
With this in mind, it seemed to be
fortunate indeed when an anonymous benefactor placed at the disposal of the Southeastern Historical
Keyboard Society (SEHKS) the
funds with which to promote new
works for the harpsichord. The result of this generosity was the 1982
Alienor Competition. The competition is now history. The results of
the competition were hardly what
either the directors or the composers
who entered works might have ex-

Keith Paulson-Thorp teaches Music
Theory and Composition at the University of Southwestern Louisiana. He
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Contemporary music draws
few talented performers.
pected.
Being a relatively new operation,
the SEHKS made every attempt to
run a professional competition. The
Alienor received excellent advance
publicity with announcements appearing in most major periodicals
in the field. Awards, it was announced, would be made in two categories. The first would embrace
works of more than fifteen minutes
duration, the second works of less
than eight minutes duration.
The prizes ranged in size from
five hundred to four thousand dollars , making this one of the most
attractive competitions for composers in recent years. Works submitted must have been written during the past several years, could not
have received a public performance,
and could not have received any
other prize. The panel requested
that a tape of each entry be submitted
when possible.
Many of these requirements are
standard fare in any competition.
Certain points, however, raised a
number of eyebrows. First, there
was no category for works of between
eight and fifteen minutes duration.
A substantial amount of the contemporary repertoire, as well as much
of the historical repertoire, falls into
this category. Any of the Bach
French Suites would have been ineligible in such a competition as
would many substantial works of
this century, such as the sonatas of
Martinu or Persichetti.
Second, if the work were new and
unperformed, the composer would
not have had the opportunity to review and revise his work or to evaluate its public appeal. If the purpose of the competition was to add
significant new works to the repertoire, that goal was thus impeded.
Third, if the work were unperformed, where might the tape come
from? Harpsichordists who are willing to learn difficult new works, and
to learn them just for the sake of
making a tape, are not exactly stand27

The most successful and revered harpsichord works of the last two decades have drawn
blatantly upon baroque prototypes and might therefore be called "pseudo-baroque."
ing on every street corner. That the
rules of the competition required
seriou s overhauling became painfully evident to the directors only
after the judging had begun.
If there were qualms about the
competition before it commenced,
even greater problems came to light
after the decisions had been announced. The stated purpose of the
competition was to stimulate the
creation of a significant new repertoire for the harpsichord and to foster interest among composers in the
unique tonal properties of the instrument. This would seem to imply
that little or no repertoire from our
century existed at the time the competition was announced. What was
actually being declared was that the
existing repertoire was not idiomatic to the instruments currently
in vogue.
Since the mid-Sixties, the heavier,
less responsive, factory-built instruments have gradually been replaced
by instruments designed in accordance with prototypes from the eighteenth century. These historicallybased instruments are more brilliant
in tone but less versatile in the matter of changing registrations during
performance. Many performers,
however, feel that the differences
between the instruments are largely
cosmetic and that they do not actually affect the basic musical properties of the instrument; the musical
merits of the existing literature
would then outweigh the logistical
problems of adapting it to a slightly
different instrument. This group has
given credence to its case by performing this repertoire on historically-based instruments both in
concert and on recordings.
The assertion of seeking to create
a "new" repertoire is further ambiguous with respect to style preference.
Of the myriad styles currently practiced in music composition, which
one should be used as the basis for
the new repertoire? If stylistic choice
is thus limited, are the competing
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styles then inappropriate? Should
music which deliberately avoids
obvious stylistic connections with
the past be avoided or encouraged?
And what of works which are modelled after the great works of the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries? A return to the solidity of structural principles of the past has certainly been a hallmark of the stylistic
retrenchment found in the music of
many important living composers.

A return to the solidity
of structural principles
of the past has been a
hallmark of the stylistic
retrenchment found in the
music of many important
living composers.
At the preliminary judging the
category for works of more than fifteen minutes was eliminated. The
prize monies from that category
were to be used for the commissioning of new works by established
composers. Adding insult to injury,
the judges issued a statement to the
effect that the entries submitted
were generally unidiomatic, that the
composers were obviously not familiar with the current instrument and
its characteristics, and that composers should develop a "truly modern" idiom for solo harpsichord
rather than a "pseudo-baroque"
idiom.
If such comments had the intention of establishing a stylistic norm
for modern music, they were not
likely to succeed with such nebulous terminology. The proliferation
of compositional techniques generated in the past half-century prohibits the classification of one group
of techniques as distinctly more
"modern" than another. Moreover,
it is virtually impossible to construct
a harpsichord work that does not
relate in some very obvious way to
its baroque predecessors.
During the three hundred years
when the harpsichord was at its

zenith of popularity, composers explored an exhaustive compendium
of idiomatic devices . Most of these
devices were applicable to a wide
variety of stylistic contexts and continue to be applicable to the styles
in use today. Any attempt at creating a new repertoire of "idiomatic"
techniques will only display the artist's lack of contact with the past; he
will be repeating history.
Only the assaults on the interior
of the instruments, explored in the
Sixties and Seventies, have yielded
a new body of sonic materials. These
effects, however, tend to draw attention to themselves as novelties rather
than to their functions as building
blocks in a musical structure. Many
of these extended techniques even
damage the instrument on which
they are executed.
The most successful and revered
harpsichord works of the last two
decades have drawn blatantly upon
baroque prototypes and might therefore be called "pseudo-baroque." A
consistently high level of activity,
the use of overlapping hands, and a
profusion of ornamental filigree are
common both in baroque works for
the instrument and in contemporary
works. Again, the use of these idiomatic techniques does not specify
one particular style over another.
Consistency of a style within a composition and the ingenuity of design (as evidenced by timing of
events, clarity of goals and movements, etc.) will generally attract a
receptive audience.
If the judges failed to expound a
foundation for their stylistic biases,
they were no less suspect in their
claim that composers did not understand the idiomatic qualities of the
instrument. Most composers, if they
wish to write for harpsichord, are
able to gain access to an instrument
and to distinguish for themselves
which techniques work most successfully. Several of the composers
whose works were entered are themselves harpsichordists. Their opinThe Cresset

The hope of writing a work whose quality will make it a worthwhile addition to the
repertoire is not as important as the hope of adding a new laurel to one's resume.
ions with regard to the idiomatic
nature of the instrument are surely
as valid as those held by the judges.
In view of these considerable
problems, it is surprising that one
might nonetheless be able to assert
that the Alienor competition was
actually a success. Of the scores of
pieces submitted from across the
United States and from several
foreign countries, five were selected
to receive awards. Of these five , four
are truly extraordinary works and
deserve the wider exposure they
may be given as a result of the competition.
Without resorting to special effects, these composers have addressed the challenge of writing for
harpsichord, an instrument which
compels the composer to deal with
music on the most abstract level (i.e.,
as a succession of frequencies and
durations devoid of dynamic
nuance), and have constructed works
which develop interesting ideas in a
cogent format. One of the more interesting features of these works is
the imagination with which composers have reintroduced large
areas of harmonic consonance into
their compositional language. If the
Alienor competition has made us
aware that a considerable number
of works from our time exists and
deserves to be heard, it has achieved
a very worthwhile goal.
What I find myself asking, however, is how many fine works were
discarded during the judging process because they failed to appeal to
the judges' stylistic tastes or to the
judges' sense of what is or is not idiomatic to the instrument. If so many
composers are working in so many
different styles and the judges have
selected only a handful to be given
public recognition, are we not being
cheated? Is there not a method by
which the Alienor monies could be
channelled into providing the kind
of exposure that would allow harpsichordists to experience the modern
repertoire and still make their own
December, 1983

decisions regarding which styles and
composers they may wish to incorporate into programs?
The directors of the competition
now face the difficult task of evaluating the competition. Options include serious restructuring as well
as the possibility of eliminating the
competition in favor of alternate
means of stimulating compositional
productivity. The very concept of a
competition to achieve the goals
outlined by the committee presents
obstacles.
For decades, it has become increasingly impossible for composers
of concert music (as opposed to
music for film, theatre, popular
entertainment, etc.) to make a living
outside of the university community. All but a few of us find the activities of teaching and performance
to be as much a part of our lives as
the activity of composition. Criteria
for survival within academia, how-

ever, hinge on the completion of a
terminal degree, successful academic experience, and recognition in the
field as supported by publications
and citations from important competitions.
Since it is difficult to find publishers for most new music, the circulation revenues from which cannot
begin to cover publishing costs,
most aspiring composers lunge full
throttle into the competition circuit.
The hope of writing a work the quality of which will make it a worthwhile addition to the repertoire is
not as important as the hope of adding a new laurel to one's resume. If
the Alienor was a stimulant in the
production of new scores, it is unlikely that the composers who produced these scores did so for other
than purely personal reasons. Established composers, the ones who
should be most encouraged to write
for harpsichord, are not generally

talkin ' purgatorio blues
like any blue lined themebook page
stripped from its comfortably spiralling steel
my brain is grasped by the pads of slender fingers
and ripped from these pot luck societies
to the tune of a mene mene tekel upharsin;
but I am scrap on which God just scribbles
with an index finger
that slices through the blue veins of my temple ...
he crumples me in his holy right fist
and hook shoots me into his executive waste basket
0 God I am not whining
but why write on my walls?
(here am I Lord) jagged and stained
crinkled and junked
but learning to psalm from this black tin
though cigarette filters sponge my eyeballs dry
and brown stained styrofoam is coffeed to my red hairblessed am I as I await transfer
into some isolated dumpster
along any back alley of gold (soli deo)
gloria gloria uh men.

Bill Stadick
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If competitions encourage the work of young artists,
they also discourage those who cannot compete.
in need of further awards and in
fact do not seem to have taken a
noticeable interest in the competition.
There is no dearth of forums for
budding composers. Competitions
are annually sponsored by the Bates
Foundation, Broadcast Music, Inc. ,
and the National Association of
Composers, among others. The aims
of these competitions are to promote
the careers of talented young composers. It is not likely that the results will be earth shattering. The
Alienor competition obviously cannot succeed as a composers' competition if its goals are to augment the
modern repertoire with quality
works.
Competitions serve a secondary
purpose as well. If they encourage
the work of young artists, they also
discourage those who are not capable of delivering the goods. Competitions weed out the starry-eyed
who are short on either talent or
dedication , and help, if only in a
nominal way , to protect the standards of the profession .
Yet the annals of music history are
replete with cases where talented
folk managed to assert their genius
in spite of disappointments on the
competition circuit. Ravel , for instance, never achieved the Prix de
Rome, in spite of frequent attempts.
Bizet, who did achieve the Prix de
Rome in 1858, was not awarded the
Rodrigues Prize the following year.
His entry, the A Major Te Deum,
was to be his last sacred work.
It is this type of reaction that
causes us to take pause. By rejecting
the works of many talented composers and by pontificating on matters of style, it is possible that the
Alienor committee is sending the
wrong signals to composers. If a
composer feels that his work is inferior because it has not placed in a
competition , or if he is told that the
style in which he writes is not suitable to the harpsichord, he will
doubtl ess not write for the instru-
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ment again. It is unfortunate that in
a contest there must be both winners
and losers. We must not lose sight
of the fact that the losers might yet
be able to contribute significant
works to the repertoire, but that they
will not feel inclined to try if their
music is rejected out of hand.
For this reason, it is imperative
that the Alienor committee consider alternatives. The commissioning of works from established composers is a viable alternative. Several major names are being considered, including Crumb, Lutoslawski, Albright, and Takemitsu.
Yet, if composers must all wait until
they are well known to begin writing for the harpsichord, how will
they improve their technique?
In place of a competition , a forum
for new harpsichord music might be
a regular part of the annual conclave of the SEHKS. Here composers and performers might exchange ideas about their crafts. The
composers whose works show the
most promise might then be commissioned to write a new work for
the instrument which would provide fuel for the following year's
forum. This approach has the advantage of bringing before the public a larger number of works and of
encouraging the exchange of ideas
necessary for the healthy evolution
of musical art.
Competitions may remain a part
of a composer's initiation rite, but
the Alienor funds should not be
channelled in this direction. The
administrative headaches and phobic reticence on the part of composers do not make competitions the
ideal method for enhancing the
harpsichord repertoire. A more productive environment for artistic exchange can bring together the heterogenous currents of contemporary
composition and focus all of these
on the central problem of writing
for the harpsichord . Then we will
have found a way to truly enrich
this already fertile repertoire.
~~

The Nation

Leaving Home
Gail McGrew Eifrig
We in America need ceremonies, is I
suppose, sailor, the point of what I have
wn·tten. John Updike

This isn't a column about Updike,
but his sentence about America's
need for ceremonies to mark our
important passages calls for some
attention. The line is the final one in
a collection of early stories by America's present-day Hawthorne, and
because his voice is so American,
those of us who care about our national definition, or identity, may
turn to him now and again for some
insights about ourselves as a nation.
Updike here seems to propose his
stories themselves as a kind of ceremony, a formalized occasion for
communal recognition , a locale for
enactment or re-enactment of an experience that is past, or passing, but
still powerful.
Though most of his characters are
clearly individuals, realized quite
completely, with all their uniquely
recognizable but surprising failures
and successes drawn out in startling
prose (imaginary suburbs with real
husbands in them , if I may be permitted an obscure literary in-joke) ,
his protagonists are relevant to us as
a group, to modern culture, to modern American culture. Updike's
stories seem to demand that we read
them aware of ourselves as members
of a group. And when I read Updike
as an American I am most of all conThe Cresset

scious of an extraordinary emphasis
on home. Something in the American psyche wrestles that theme insistently, refusing to let the angel go
until a blessing is given. Is it true
that for Americans, going home is
more important and more impossible than for others?
While I'm writing this, we've just
sent James Watt home from Washington. That's a disgrace, and even
the Western gimmickry of an announcement
from
horseback
couldn't disguise it. Sent home. It's
different of course to go home,
which is what all American writers
try to do and find they can't. Again.
There's "run along home," another
phrase Updike uses, echoing from
all our childhoods, a promise of reception with an implied message
that there's somewhere to be sent
from.
Home is where the heart is, on the
range perhaps, or down home, an
expression so stubbornly American
that only John Denver or Jim Croce
could explain it to a German or a
Japanese. To those of us who read
lots of Robert Frost, home is the
place where when you have to go
there, they have to take you in, or
alternatively, something you somehow haven't to deserve.
We aren't always certain that we
mean a compliment when we talk
about home. It is interesting that the
British prime minister conducts
business from an address, but the
American president has a house.
That implies that though his may
be bigger and whiter than ours, it
isn't any better, or any more privileged. It's a wonderfully homely
thing to call the headquarters of such
a powerful figure, and he works
there too, like the fellow who sells
insurance from the back bedroom,
done over with office furniture from
Sears. In this way, we have domesticated at least a portion of the government, and we thereby keep it in its
place.
Generally, when we refer to home
we mean that something is better,
like home cooking, or homemade
pie. But made by loving hands at
home is not a compliment; it means
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that something bought with money
would be better, but you'll make do.
We seem to be ambivalent about
home even at this prosaic level. We
do praise home cooking, but we're a
nation that eats out more than one
meal in four.
Of course there is coming home,
a ceremony participated in by many
middle-class Americans in the fall of
the year, a ritual that marks quite
profoundly just how ambiguous we
are about the whole business of
home. Homecomings are officially
celebrated not at anybody's home,
but at college, places no one (except
a few tweedy types who teach) ever
calls home. In a way, the message
that a college homecoming sends is
absolutely that you can't go home
again. Never at any other time is one
confronted more dramatically with
inexorable change in oneself and in
those with whom one shared pieces
of the past. To quote Updike again,
this time talking about his desire to
write about his grandmother:
It seemed incumbent upon me. necessary
and holy. to tell how once there had been a
woman who now was no more. how she
had been born and lived in a world that had
ceased to exist. though its mementoes were
all about us ..

Though its mementoes may be all
about us, home always means the
past, and the past is irrecoverable.
Homecoming, a time to visit a place
that is not-was never-a home ,
soon gives way to the next season.

When a friend asks you if you are
going home for the holidays, she
certainly does not mean the place
you actually live, the place you pay
rent for or water the plants in. We
imply, when we ask each other that
question , really large questions
about ourselves and our relations
to the past.
Some Americans never leave
home. But for the majority, home is
a place you have left; we are so mobile that we are never surprised to
be asked, "Where is your home?"
even when we are standing in it. To
be from somewhere else is a supremely American quality. And
this great national homesickness
certainly is a part of Updike's view
of us as a people. The point of what
he has written, at least in those exquisitely painful and beautiful early
stories, seems to be that we recognize more clearly the moment of
our leaving home. Knowing our
past is important, because we balance on a little rim of present between what was and what will be.
But it would be a pity for us as a
people, as it would be for any individual, not to leave home. It would
be a pity for us to allow ourselves to
be haunted by a nostalgia for some
past home-our cozy, nineteenthcentury self-righteous isolation, for
example-and to be unaware that
we had left that home for a new
place. We need ceremonies to mark
for us the fact that we have left home.
That is what adults do, after all. Cl
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The Last
Word
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------In Whose Eye?

Dot Nuechterlein
True confessions time: I am not a
painted lady.
You probably have no idea how
traumatic it is for a modern middleclass woman to make that statement.
For if there is anything that separates one from the rest of the species,
the failure to wear make-up just
might be it. In fact, offhand I cannot
think of anyone of roughly my background and station in life over the
age of about thirteen who faces the
world as unadorned as I.
Once, when I resisted her highpowered sales pitch, a department
store cosmetician sneered at me:
"My dear, no one goes around with
a naked face! "
Except me. Here is my so-called
"beauty" routine:
A /ways: moisturizer.
Usually: lipstick.
Often: mascara.
Regularly: cologne.
Occasionally: nail polish.
Never: powder, pancake, foundation, blusher , slicker , toner, rouge,
astringent, cleansing cream , hormone cream, concealer, highlighter,
wrinkle cream, beauty grains, vanish ing cream, mud pack, cuticle
cream, eyeliner, eyeshadow, eyebrow pencil, brow tweezers, false
lashes, lash curlers.
The list goes on. As you can see,
my cupboard is practically bare,
and the billion-dollar cosmetics
industry would shudder at such
heresy.
Now there are only two questions
32

which might be worth asking about
this state of affairs: (1) How come?
and (2) So what?
As to the first, I am a sociologist,
one who believes in the concept of
socialization. Somewhere back in
late childhood/early adolescence
the message that girls were supposed to pretty up their faces simply
didn't sink in. My mother and all
my other role models-friends, favorite relatives, movie stars, etc.wore make-up, so the social lack was
my fault , not theirs.
The only thing about me that I
can remember being different from
most other kids was that I didn't
have acne. My children find this
hard to believe, but I wasn't plagued
at all with what they call "zits." And
that plus naturally embarrassingly
rosy cheeks became part of my identity. Maybe if I had been voted
something glamorous like Miss Per·sonality or Miss Most Likely To
Succeed instead of the prosaic Miss
Complexion of Tell City High
School for four years in a row, things
might have been different.
Anyway, it always looked to me
like cosmetics were plenty of timeconsuming bother. Expensive, too.
So somehow I just never got into the
habit. Later in life I was active in
theater groups and became quite
proficient at applying the stuff, but
it was too late to translate that into
the daily routine.
Well, maybe not. Now that old
age is creeping up it may be a good
idea to camouflage the ravages of
time like everyone else does. Which
leads us to point two.
There is no doubt but what mature skin loses vitality, elasticity,
and color, while gaining creases and
lines that appear unbidden. I have
no quarrel with women using every
bit of ammunition available to improve upon nature, and when artfully made up, many look absolutely
smashing.
My primary concern, however, is

that this process begins so early,
long before there is any intrinsic
necessity. For the past decade I have
been h anging around college campuses, and let me tell you, the "natural look" is no more. The trend is
clearly toward more and more faceglop, and lots of lovely skin never
sees the light of day. (When I taught
at eight a.m. I learned that some
young women would rather skip
class or die than arrive sans beauty
ritu al.)
Why do they do it? Obviously because they think it makes them more
attractive. But where do we get our
sense of beauty? Not from within,
of cou rse, but from the image reflected back to us by others.
We know that from Cleopatra onward, most cultures have espoused
facial and bodily decoration , changing styles notwithstanding. Yet seldom has the use of cosmetics been
as pervasive throughout all age
levels as in our society. While I am
not anti-business, nor do I object to
selling products through the use of
advertisements, it seems likely to
me that today's ultra-hard sell aimed
at females has set our standards for
us. And that troubles me.
One thing I would like to know is
whether this view of beauty apparently common among women today, namely, an all-out dependence
on cosmetics, is the same one held
by men. We like to say we are pleasing ourselves by the way we dress
and look and act, but probably most
of the time most of us want to please
them, too.
Only we have gotten so sensitive
about being regarded as mere physical objects that many men have
learned to shut up about our appearance altogether. So if the girl with
purplish cheeks and greenish eye
sockets and whitish lips is less an
appealing sight than simply a sight,
who is going to tell her? And should
someone dare, would she be apt to
C:
care?
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